Jack Goldsmith chats with Stephen Vladeck, the Agnes Williams Sesquicentennial Professor of Federal Courts at Georgetown University Law Center, about Vladeck’s Foreword in the Harvard Law Review, “The Court Against the Courts.” In an office at Gannett House, the home of the Harvard Law Review, they discuss the caseloads, impeachment resolutions, and threats that district judges have faced since early 2025, and Vladeck’s argument that the Supreme Court bears significant responsibility for their predicament. They also cover whether the Court is likely to change its behavior in anticipation of reforms that Congress may pursue beginning in 2029, as well some of the reforms Vladeck proposes in his upcoming book, The Court We Need.
This chat is cross-posted at One First.
Mentioned:
Stephen Vladeck, “The Court Against the Courts,” Foreword, Harvard Law Review, vol. 140 (November 2026)
Jack Goldsmith, “Interim Orders, the Presidency, and Judicial Supremacy,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 139 (November 2025)
Stephen Vladeck, The Court We Need: What’s Really Wrong with the Supreme Court—and How to Fix It (Viking, forthcoming May 2027)
This is an edited transcript of an episode of “Executive Functions Chat.” You can listen to the full conversation by following or subscribing to the show on Substack, Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
Jack Goldsmith: I’m Jack Goldsmith at Harvard Law School, and I’m talking today with Stephen Vladeck about his excellent foreword in the Harvard Law Review, November 2026 issue, called “The Court Against the Courts.” And this recording and discussion is the first, and maybe not the last, cross-posting discussion between One First and Executive Functions. So Steve, congratulations on your great article.
Stephen Vladeck: Thanks, Jack. Thank you, Jack.
So what is the core claim? What do you think the Supreme Court has done wrong, vis-a-vis district courts, since early 2025?
Well, it took 104 pages. But let me say first, thanks to you for doing this, and thanks to the Harvard Law Review for hosting us. What do I think the Supreme Court’s doing wrong?
So I think the principal thing that the court is doing wrong is that I think it is, and I say this in the piece, increasingly viewing the district courts less as sort of the first step in the federal judicial system and more as basically just adjuncts to the justices in their function. And I think that manifests in lots of different ways. So the court has curtailed some of the formal authorities that district courts have to hold the executive branch in particular accountable, whether by curbing the universal injunctions or by reading the Tucker Act more expansively or by foreclosing APA review in certain immigration cases.
The court has, as you know and you wrote about last year in the Harvard Law Review, issued a remarkable number of interim emergency orders, basically allowing the Trump administration to continue doing things that district courts have said were unlawful without actually saying those lower courts were wrong. And I think really importantly, the court has enabled some of the attacks on district courts and some of the defiance of district courts by allowing contempt of district courts to go sort of unremarked upon in the Alien Enemies and third-country removals cases by sort of not doing more to push back against some of the very aggressive attacks on district courts by the executive branch, by the current Congress, et cetera. And in the NIH v. American Public Health Association case from August 2025, the Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh concurrence, which accused district courts even of defying the Supreme Court for not following the tea leaves of some of the earlier emergency docket rulings. So add this all together and you get a different story about the October 2025 term than if you just tallied up the outcomes of the big rulings.
And that’s what I was hoping to convey in the foreword.
Okay, great. So you paint a remarkable picture and I want you to re-describe it about what the last 18 months have looked like from a district court judge’s perspective. Instead of focusing on the Supreme Court, how has it looked for the district court judges? They’ve kind of been overwhelmed, threatened, abused, in your telling. What has it looked like from the district court’s perspective?
Yeah, I think the line I use in the foreword is sort of under assault from every direction. And part of that is just a pure function of volume, that you have district court dockets that have blown up. A lot of the volume piece is actually attributable to one particular subset of cases, to immigration detention cases, where there are bars on class-wide or even district-wide relief.
And so you have tens of thousands of individual habeas petitions. There’s a data point in the foreword about the Southern District of Indiana, hardly a hotbed of ICE enforcement activity, that went from a grand total of one immigration habeas case in 2023 and 2024 combined, to somewhere north of like 500 in the first year and 10 months of 2025-26. So part of it’s just volume, which is that they are inundated with cases.
And these cases are all important, high profile. I have a friend who’s a judge on the Western District of Washington, who says that she tells, basically, ordinary civil litigants, we’ll see you in a couple of years.
And just to be clear, this is Trump administration-induced litigation.
Yes, yes. I mean, so not everything is the Trump administration. But the bulk of it is. The overall majority is that. So point number one is the volume. Point number two is the district courts are being sort of attacked, both institutionally and personally.
So some of that is social media rhetoric, where you have, for example, the General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, having a “worst of the worst” list of district judges who have ruled against the Trump administration, in one of the cases of which the big sort of controversy was over the judge releasing an immigration detainee who had an international arrest warrant out against him, even though DOJ had never told the judge that there was an international arrest warrant out against them. You have the sort of impeachment resolutions.
There are now 13 different federal district judges with pending impeachment resolutions in the House. Over the previous 15 years before last January, that number totaled one. And I think at least 12 of those 13 resolutions are about judges whose real crime was ruling against the administration.
I mentioned the wanted posters. I mean, so you have judges who are receiving threats. There are stories about pizza doxing, where federal judges all over the country have received pizza deliveries to their private home addresses in the name of the murdered son of Judge Esther Salas in New Jersey, sort of a “we know where you live” type of thing.
And you have the rhetoric coming from senior administration officials, President Trump himself, Attorney General Blanche, who at last year’s Federalist Society Convention repeatedly referred to being at war with district judges. And so I think you have sort of district courts who are overwhelmed by volume, who are being assaulted and attacked in ways we haven’t seen before, who are under threat in ways we haven’t seen before, and who are getting very little in the way of support from the appellate courts, especially the Supreme Court.
Okay, so I completely agree with your descriptive account. And it’s, I think, historically unprecedented and reprehensible, especially to have the administration and Republicans in Congress attacking, using the impeachment threat in ways that don’t comply with past impeachment norms, personally threatening. The social media stuff is crazy. What’s coming out of the White House? I agree completely. The Supreme Court has suffered some of that, not to the same degree.
I mean, there have been personal—Justice Barrett and Kagan, the swatting—Barrett and Kagan, when they testified, Justice Barrett basically went into great detail about the threat she’s faced. Justice Kavanaugh had that person at his house. So I think the threats have been on the whole judiciary.
And the White House has been, at least the president has been, critical of the court in some respects, although not nearly as much as has been directed to the lower courts. And I think that the impeachment threats and the political threats from Congress have been much less, if maybe non-existent, with regard to the court. So it’s fair to say that the Supreme Court has suffered some of this, but not to the same degree.
But I agree with all that. And there’s at least some of that in the foreword. I know I’m just—but I do think that, I would have thought that in ordinary times, that would make the justices feel like they were in it together with the judges on the lower courts.
That we are going, this sucks for us, and therefore, we understand that it sucks for you. And I feel like that almost makes it even more interesting and odd, and to my mind, problematic, that there’s this increasing disconnect between how they’re reacting.
(7:34) So I’m not sure I share that view, completely. But I’m going to get there in a second. I want to just ask you one more element of your thesis out.
You started talking about this a little bit. I’m quoting from your piece. You say, the Supreme Court bears significant responsibility for the travails of the courts below, through its own behavior, the direct and indirect effect of its rulings, through its rhetoric, through its refusal to meaningfully push back against those broader attacks on the district courts.
Could you just, you’ve talked about that a little bit. Can you flesh that out a little more?
Sure, I mean, so I guess, some of this is a counterfactual, but imagine a universe in which, as early as April 2025, the Supreme Court, say in the Alien Enemies case, is quite aggressively critical of the Trump administration for not turning the planes around, right? For defying Judge Boasberg’s TRO. Imagine if the court, even while granting relief, says, that’s not to say that we condone the Justice Department’s behavior—in the third-country removals case. To the contrary, right? The district court’s order should have been obeyed until we stayed it.
Imagine if Justice Gorsuch, in the NIH case, had said a version of what Justice Kavanaugh actually did say a couple weeks later at the Eighth Circuit Conference, which is, hey, we understand that you guys, district courts, are in a really tough position. We’re not mad at you, right? Help us help you.
And that just hasn’t been the tone. The tone all along has been, what’s happening in the lower courts is no nevermind to the Supreme Court. We’ve had a grand total of two public statements from Chief Justice Roberts, and I think you could easily have missed both of them.
And we have situations where I think the court is actually affirmatively, if not endorsing the administration’s attacks and defiance, I said, if not endorsing, enabling. So to me, when you have, in the NIH case, Justice Gorsuch invoke as two of the examples, two of his three examples of defiance: the third-country removals case, where the defiance was by the government, right?
And Boyle, where even Justice Kavanaugh conceded that lower courts were in a bind because what do you do when you have a 95-year-old precedent, and also you think we’re going to overrule it? Like, I just, it’s sort of the, I don’t think the court necessarily wants any of this, but I do think it has been very willfully blind to how its actions have shaped the litigation of the lower courts.
Okay, I want to come back, I think the counterfactual question is really important, and I want to come back to that. I have exactly the opposite intuition, but I want to ask you some questions before we get to that. So here’s my first, here’s the first thing about your piece I don’t really understand.
Part one, you paint this picture, which I agree with, of these enormously consequential and brave district courts that are standing up to the Trump administration quite amazingly successfully. I would say that there have never been district courts that have more successfully stood up to presidential lawlessness than it’s been widespread in the face of abuses. So they’ve done an amazing job in upholding the rule of law. I think you agree with that.
I do.
I don’t understand, but then in part two, I think, you say the Supreme Court has basically hollowed them out and made it impossible for them to vindicate the rule of law. I don’t see how those two parts fit together.
Sure, so I guess what I would say is, part two is an argument that part one has happened notwithstanding—right?—moves the Supreme Court has made both overtly and less overtly. And so the examples I try to use, right?
One is the Metro Surge litigation. So just take for a second as an example, all of ICE’s, I’ll just say, misbehavior in and around Minneapolis in January of this year. Why was it so hard to get any kind of judicial relief against what to all appearances was widespread systematic Fourth Amendment violations?
I would even say probably some Fifth Amendment violations too, right? And some of that is because of the Supreme Court’s interventions, whether in limiting the universal injunctions in the CASA case, right? Whether in Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Vasquez Perdomo, which takes, I think, an unduly expansive reading of the limits on standing to obtain law enforcement injunctions under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.
Like there are direct obstacles. And so I think there are chunks of cases, maybe even large categories of cases, where the district courts have been remarkably effective and where the Supreme Court has not stopped them. But there are others.
And I think it’s worth like playing out what is meant. So another example is the funding cases, right? The Tucker Act cases, which don’t get nearly as much visibility because who cares about the Tucker Act? I do, I care about it.
So do I.
But in the media, in the real world, these funding cases are massively important.
And we have a 660-word majority opinion from April of 2025, and then no majority opinion NIH case having this massive effect on delaying, in some cases for years, relief for violations that everyone agrees have happened in cutting off funding to researchers, to universities, to other programs. And so it seems to me that two things, given the denominator, given the volume of litigation we’re talking about, two things can be true. There are some areas where the lower courts have been remarkably effective, and there are others where they have been decidedly hollowed out.
But I just, let me just pressure on the second point. I just think that’s an exaggeration because yes, I don’t agree with everything the court’s done. I agree with you about the Tucker Act cases.
That’s such an important issue. They should have explained it in more depth. They probably should have taken a case on the merits or at least for full argument on that.
But some of these cases, some of these issues, the court has made its rulings. It’s not making its rulings in a lot of these cases to crack down on the district courts. It’s making its rulings on the merits of what it thinks the right answer is.
And yes, that means that in some cases, the lower courts aren’t able to give as much relief on the merits as it otherwise would. But that strikes me as kind of normal and marginal, especially compared to what you describe in part one.
So, I don’t know. I mean, I think it’s the marginality, I think, is a relative question, right? I think the Alien Enemies case is a good sort of part of how I’d respond to that, which is, so the Alien Enemies, President Trump in March of 2025, right, you know this, invokes the Alien Enemies Act as a basis for being able to remove from the country however many Venezuelan men who he claims are members of Tren de Aragua.
Judge Boasberg issues a nationwide TRO that basically, other than the immediate noncompliance, right, freezes Alien Enemies Act removals. The Supreme Court, in its J.G.G. ruling, says you can’t do that, right? And so it sort of throws open the door to needing district-by-district litigation, the Alien Enemies Act.
Two things have happened since, right? First is that district-by-district litigation has been pretty chaotic, including requiring the Supreme Court to actually rule after midnight on a Friday night in the Northern District of Texas case, something I don’t think they would have ever wanted to do. The second is, you know, as you and I sit here in November of 2026, the Supreme Court isn’t anywhere close to actually answering the question of whether that proclamation was lawful and whether the president has the authority to do any of this.
But why does it matter? Because the Supreme Court shut it down. Well, did it? Didn’t it? I mean, to a degree.
Didn’t the injunction in the Fifth Circuit case, I mean, that case has now gone away and the Trump administration, as best I can tell, has stopped.
It hasn’t really gone away, though, right? Because we had the en banc Fifth Circuit in Sosnava Rodriguez say, actually, this is totally fine and there are no due process rights at all.
But have there been an Alien Enemies Act deportation since the Supreme Court enjoined it?
No.
Okay, so that strikes me as an important fact.
It is, but it took the second ruling, right?
Yeah, I agree.
Okay.
I agree it took the second ruling.
But so, Jack, how many cases don’t have a second ruling is what I’m trying to say, right? So for, you know, yes, in the Alien Enemies Act example, you had a second ruling. This is like Richard Re’s argument that, you know, what happened in Trump v. Barbara, you know, proves that the sort of concerns about the demise of universal injunctions were overstated.
That’s true when the cases come back to the Supreme Court on the merits and the court does something on the merits as it, you know, forced the Solicitor General to allow it to do birthright citizenship.
(15:49) What about the cases that don’t come back? See, I want to talk to you about that, but I want to go back to your counterfactual point, because I think this is just a fundamental disagreement we have. I don’t understand what your counterfactual looks like.
It seems to me that if the court, Supreme Court did, so you think that the court, as I understand it, has enabled the attacks on the, the Supreme Court has enabled the attacks on the district courts by its rulings, especially in the interim orders docket, but not exclusively. And so let’s imagine that every, that the court just denied every one of those 25 or so applications.
Okay.
And as you, I think you would like, the district court—
I’m not sure every one of them.
Well, but—
Most of them.
Most of them. As you would like, the district courts were deferred to, and that the rulings against the president, that the court, in a relatively small percentage of the cases, compared to the overall cases, where the court sided, where the court stayed or stopped, what the district court had done. Let’s say the district court had been able to get its way on all that, and normal appellate process would have done. And whether there were or weren’t universal injunctions, a lot of the, even more of the Trump program would not have been implemented.
What is the counterfactual in which it gets better for federal courts in that world, in terms of the political attacks? What is the counterfactual in which the rule of law looks better in that situation? Seems to me you’ve got a very formalistic and legalistic understanding of judicial power, when in fact, the court, I mean, this is what I wrote about last year, and I know you responded to it.
The court is playing a kind of two-level game. It’s in competition, or at least it’s under threat from the executive branch, and it’s got a lot of sharp disagreements with the lower courts. So I’m just wondering, but let’s stick to the counterfactual. What is the counterfactual world in which the court comes out every way you want it to, and the rule of law looks better?
So I guess the question, at the risk of responding to a counterfactual with a counterfactual, right?
Well, we don’t know what the counterfactual looks like.
Well, right. What is the mechanism? So this is the question, right?
The question that’s undergirding your question is like, why have the attacks been more pronounced against the district courts than against the Supreme Court, right? Because the court has ruled against Trump, right? It ruled against, I mean, this is the list that my friend Will Baude loves to trot out about all the times the court has ruled against Trump.
And Trump has taken to Truth Social to complain about his three appointees, but you haven’t seen impeachment resolutions. You haven’t seen wanted posters.
To the contrary, the SG has been making very clear that it will comply with Supreme Court orders even as the rest of the administration is attacking lower courts.
I mean, the oral argument in CASA was striking because you had in almost the same passage, right, Solicitor General Sauer throwing lower courts under the bus and saying, oh, but Cooper v. Aaron totally applies to you, Justice Barrett. And what that says to me, Jack, is that the Supreme Court still has a cachet and still has a base of political support even within the Republican Party that the lower courts don’t have.
And if the Supreme Court had been more actively involved in defending the lower courts, one of two things would have happened, right? Either the Republican support for the Supreme Court would have led some meaningful number of people to say, oh, maybe the district courts actually are behaving pretty well, right? Or it would have become the entire judiciary is the problem, not just these rogue activists, Republican-appointed Scalia clerks in the District of Minnesota.
Yeah, so I just think it just seems obvious to me that it’d be the latter. And I can’t prove it, obviously, but the reason that Sauer was giving some deference to the court is because in some sense, they need the court. I think this is the explanation for judicial review generally.
There’s this foundational question. Why does any executive branch ever comply with judicial review?
I mean, you know this better than I do, right? I mean, which is the executive branch depends upon the legitimization of the Supreme Court.
Yeah, exactly.
But so this is, are counterfactuals about to become a factual, right? Because now we’re not going to have a Supreme Court that’s going, or we’re not going to have a federal judiciary that’s out there on its own, right? The rear guard action is over as of January 3rd.
Yeah.
And so I think we’ll find out, right?
Well, now it’s going to be a three-level game for the Supreme Court. I mean, until next January, it’s been the court playing, trying to have what it thinks it can be the best relationship in terms of vindicating its view of the law and having the executive branch comply with it. That’s always a fragile thing.
It’s less fragile when you have Congress being hostile to the executive branch, right?
I was going to say. So, but it’s been fighting that battle and fighting the lower courts. You and I have, I think descriptively the same account, but normatively a different account. But now it’s going to have to be accountable to another branch. Crazy idea. Yeah, so what do you think? I mean, I don’t think it’s crazy at all.
It’s written into the Constitution.
I’m writing a whole book about it. Yeah, and it’s right there in Article III. But so how do you see that playing out?
I don’t know. I mean, I honestly don’t know. And please don’t ask me to write another foreword.
I guess I’ll just say two things. The first is just before dropping the thread on your point, right? I do think it’s worth asking, even if you are fully on board with the notion that at least some of what the court was doing was playing the institutional long game.
I do think that’s what it was doing.
I know, and I think that’s Will’s view as well. I think we’d have to account for the costs, which is, right? You know, did the court err too far, right, in sort of throwing district courts under the bus as I think it did.
I don’t, can we just talk about that for a second?
Yeah, you don’t like that, yeah.
I think you can say that about the Gorsuch and Kavanaugh opinion, which I thought was imprudent. I thought that was, and I think that Justice Kavanaugh tried to walk it back. I don’t think you can say that the Supreme Court is throwing the lower courts under the bus.
Let me just give you a perspective. I think you disagree with this, but let me offer it. I mean, there’s a reason why only the Solicitor General has only taken a tiny percentage of its losses to the Supreme Court.
Right, 45, it’s a high number for emergency applications. It’s a very small number of adverse rulings.
Small number compared to adverse rulings. And that’s because it knows, I believe, that it’s not going to win those cases in the Supreme Court. And that means that for all of those cases, that’s the prediction by the Solicitor General, for all those cases, that means that the Supreme Court is invisibly backing up what the district courts are doing.
It wouldn’t be happening that way if the SG could be going to the court and getting adverse rulings.
Yeah, I’ll just say, I mean, I think this is the same argument that the Supreme Court deserves credit for staying out of the mail-in ballots case, right? And for staying out of Missouri redistricting, right? Like, I don’t know that we could—
I don’t think it’s the same argument. That was a case where—
I think that’s participation trophies. Like, you know, the—
I don’t think so. Why has the SG not appealed many more losses?
I mean, yes, I agree. The reason why the SG has not appealed more is because he’s cherry-picking the cases where he thinks he has the strongest chance of winning. And so, yes, the specter of meaningful Supreme Court review is limiting the appeals.
Of course, that also, because of what the Supreme Court has done, is limiting the precedential effects of these losses, which is not nothing in this space, right? I mean, the appellate void’s a real problem in a world without universal injunctions. But putting all that aside, right?
I still think that if you were to ask a sort of a random district judge, right, who’s not at either extreme end of the ideological spectrum, you know, what do you think the, how do you think the Supreme Court’s been doing? They would say they’ve been making their life a lot harder.
Yeah. Well, everybody’s life has been hard. But let me agree with you. I mean, everybody’s life’s been, the court’s life’s been hard, the district court’s life’s been hard, the Trump administration’s made everybody’s life hard.
Except Congress, which doesn’t have to do anything. But, yeah.
(23:36) But what would you, what would you have the court do exactly? Would you have the Chief Justice speak out more?
Yes.
Okay, and what should he be saying?
So, I mean, I think it’s really striking. I think we threw this in a footnote in like one of the last edits, which is that the Chief’s dissent in the ballroom case was his first separate opinion, and his only separate opinion in the entire October 2025 term. He could write more.
And, you know, imagine a world, Jack, where in the third-country removals case, where, you know, I think you and I probably disagree on the substance of the jurisdictional question. Imagine if the Chief wrote a concurrence that says, I’m voting for the stay because I agree that the district court likely didn’t have jurisdiction. The government’s likely to succeed on the merits.
But no one should construe my vote as endorsing the government’s appalling litigation behavior. Right?
Okay, and what happens next? So that’s, let’s say the Chief says that. So what does the Trump administration then have to say? Oh, wow, the Chief issued these words against us. We better be careful what we say and do. That’s not going to happen. So the opposite is going to happen.
We’re back to counterfactuals because—what is the plausible counterfactual?
I think two things happen. First, that’s when he—
Let me tell you one more thing. He got hell when he made those relatively banal remarks about impeachment.
Yeah, I mean, so listen, are there crazy people in the Trump administration who are going to say crazy things? Yes. And in their Congress.
Are there lawyers who are going to behave differently? Right, are there—in the Justice Department.
Yeah.
You think? Maybe, the line attorneys who are left, maybe. I mean, no, not, yeah, no, not the senior folk.
Not Stanley Woodward and not Todd Blanche. But also, Jack, now put yourself in the position of the district judge, right? You see that concurrence from the Chief and you say, he understands what, like, he actually gets it.
So that seemed to me to be the trade-off. That, and I, look, I’m with you on, you know, the court being hard-ass on compliance with interim orders that have the sentences of reasoning. I mean, and I can understand a lot of the frustrations of the district court.
And, you know, maybe the district courts would feel better if they had a few sentences like that from the Chief Justice in opinions. And maybe that would make them feel like the court had their back more. And I just assume you’re right about that.
It just seems like, as you said earlier, there’s just a trade-off here and it’s not clear which way it goes.
I agree it’s not clear, but I think that you are undervaluing the signaling function that at least some folks would receive from a court that was willing to rule for the administration on the merits, but not, but to affirmatively chastise it for its behavior. That I think that the notion that those signals would fall on completely deaf ears in the executive branch, I think, is also a counterfactual. I don’t think that they would fall on deaf ears.
And we’re repeating ourselves. I’ll give you the last word on this. No, because I also want to answer your question about going forward.
Okay, we’ll come back to that. I don’t think it would fall on deaf ears. I think that it would fall on open ears and that they would be ferocious in response.
That’s what I think. And I don’t think the court would be better off. I don’t think the court would be a more powerful position.
I think it would be in a more fraught position by the times it stood up to the Trump administration. But I don’t think the attacks in the lower courts would have diminished. I just don’t see how that would have helped at all.
But if you believe like I do, right, that the average person on the street can’t really distinguish between, you know, sort of impugning the integrity of the lower courts and impugning the integrity of the Supreme Court, then I think the notion that the Supreme Court can somehow remain above it all, right, is something that you and I might think because we spend all of our lives distinguishing between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. But I think it is, again, missing the costs, right?
There’s cost, there’s no doubt cost. And I agree, and I said this in the piece I wrote last year, what the court’s mainly been doing, and you agree with this too, I think, it’s mainly been consolidating its power vis-a-vis the executive branch and vis-a-vis the lower courts.
That’s been its focus. I think we’re speaking about a they, not an it, but the they and the majority have been enhancing their authority as best they can, which is, by the way, what the court tends to do in history.
Yeah, I mean, but that gets to the forward-looking question.
(27:34) Okay, great. So let’s close with this forward-looking question.
I think the forward-looking question is really interesting, and I think it gets back to the sort of the consolidation-of-power point.
So, you know, now you have the same Supreme Court with the same justices. I think this is the court we’re going to have, right, at least until 2029.
Yep.
And I think, well—
Unless someone dies, in which there’s not going to be any. Right. There’s not going to be any replacement.
So we’re not going to get any new justices. Right, I would bet a fair amount of money that there will be no new justices before 2029.
I would bet my whole savings on that.
I don’t know that I’d go that far.
Really, what’s the scenario in which there’s a new justice in the next two years?
In a universe in which Trump is willing to appoint a moderate Republican circuit judge, right?
To replace?
A Republican. Or replace a conservative, yeah.
Maybe so, okay. That ain’t going to happen.
No, but again—
It’s possible, it’s possible. Okay, keep going. I’m sorry, tell me about the future.
So, I think the question, right, so this is a big theme of my forthcoming book on the court, which is sort of to what extent has the court become insulated from political pressure and from especially legislative pressure? And you know as well as anyone that Congress used to have all kinds of ways in which it nudged the court, pushed the court, shoved the court, and then it stopped deploying any of those.
I think it now seems at least statistically likely that we’re going to have a Democratic trifecta in 2029 where at least some of the platform is going to be court reform. And to me the question is does that possibility, right, have any influence on the court over the next two years or if not, when it actually comes to bear in 2029?
So, if history is a guide, it will, I think. Starting back with the early Marshall Court, arguably the FDR, there are other examples.
Reconstruction.
Reconstruction, definitely. And I completely agree. Basically, Congress has gotten out of the business. They’ve basically turned over the docket and everything the court does to the court. And that’s been, and you’ve documented this and it’s a long-term trend. Are you allowed to tell us what you propose or is that for the book?
Sure, no, no. How dare you? No, so, I mean, you know this.
I mean, I think that like the real problem with the Supreme Court we have, right, is not the personnel or the principles. It’s the extent to which it’s become completely unaccountable.
Tell me, I’ve heard you say that. They’re not unaccountable and you can clarify. They’re not unaccountable in the sense that you’re talking about. They’re accountable to the executive in some sense because it has to comply or not comply. And they’re accountable to Congress because as you’re about to tell me, and I agree, Congress can do all sorts of things to their directors.
How about this? They have become unaccountable to a completeness that has not been.
Because the Congress has sat on its heels.
Well, so two things have happened, right? One, Congress has not just sat on its heels, it’s actually affirmatively surrendered a bunch of the leverage it used to pull. And the second is the court used to have, you know, a centrist bloc that whatever else you might say about it had a tendency of moderating the more extreme institutional impulses that you might otherwise have seen.
I think we’ve still got a centrist bloc. It’s just in a different, the center has moved, but it’s there still.
I don’t, so I—okay, I’ll concede that.
Keep going about your proposal.
We’ll come back to the centrist. I mean, there’s a centrist bloc in the sense that any odd-number group of people has a middle.
Exactly. Right.
That’s about it. So here’s the problem, right? Like think about, Shelby County is a good example, right?
So in Shelby County, the court, you know, takes a healthy bite out of the preclearance formula. Right? And basically says, you know, of course, Congress, Roberts says this, Congress can come back and fix this. Knowing that there was zero chance, right, that a modernized coverage formula was going to make it through Congress, right?
It might now, something might happen.
Well, but that’s, so, but my point is that like, we’ve had 15, 20, 25 years of Supreme Court decisions in a world in which the court was completely confident that it would face no recrimination from Congress, that Congress would not come after its jurisdiction or its budget or the substantive interpretations of the statute it embarked upon. And I think that has enabled a lot of bad behavior, where they can take whatever cases they want and not worry about Congress being pissed off about it, where they can, you know, rule on the emergency docket the way they have without worrying about, you know, Congress coming back and saying, actually, here are the standards of review, right? The question is, how much is that going to change in 2029? And how much will the specter of those changes shape John Roberts’ behavior and Amy Coney Barrett’s behavior?
So in my view, I mean, we’d have to get into the details, but Congress has a whole array of tools. They’ve used them throughout history. They haven’t used them recently.
I do believe, I think it was Charles Black, I can’t remember, that said that basically jurisdiction is the rock of legitimate judicial review. And I basically think Congress, and I believe that, judicial review by an unelected judiciary in a democracy, that’s absolutely the rock, and Congress has control, power to change that. And, you know, we maybe differ about the details or how much is needed, but I think that’s an entirely legitimate perspective.
But so to how, because you asked how, I don’t want to duck. So the book has a sort of a broad point, which is that any reform should be geared toward reinvigorating that interbranch dynamic. And so even sort of modest little itty-bitty statutes, if they come with a lot of other modest itty-bitty statutes would actually be a salutary development.
Like what?
So again, first, no matter what they do, but second, and specifically, so an Article III Inspector General, right? Not to actually change the rules for ethics, not to change rules for financial disclosure, but just to get to a point where we’re not relying upon ProPublica to be the arbiter of whether Justice X filed the right thing at the right time. Like I think that could have enormous salutary effect.
I think you could also do it in a way that wouldn’t raise any Appointments Clause concerns, right? Because the court can appoint inferior judicial officers like the four officers the court already has.
100%, great, keep going.
Docket reform, I think Congress should bring back at least some of the court’s mandatory jurisdiction. This is actually now increasingly popular among some of the—
How would you craft that? What kind of cases would you make?
Yep, so there are three sets in particular I would start with. First, I would take the certification power in 1254(2), which allows the Courts of Appeals to certify questions to the Supreme Court, which has basically been dormant for 45 years. [Iran National Airlines], I think, was the last time the court took one.
I’d make it mandatory. But, right, with one condition, it has to be a majority of the en banc Court of Appeals that certifies, so that you can’t just have an outlier panel on the First Circuit or the Fifth Circuit, right, doing it. Give the lower court some control over the court’s docket.
I would actually bring back universal injunction, but with a higher standard. And I would have those have to go to three-judge district courts with automatic mandatory appeals to the Supreme Court on an expedited timeline, so you take pressure off of the emergency docket. I think the one that you will like less, I would actually require at least one mandatory appeal in every capital case, right.
Probably, I think, for procedural reasons, the best place to do it is from the state post-conviction proceeding, just so that by the time we get all these 11th-hour emergency applications, the court has had one full bite at the apple.
How would you, this is very esoteric, but how would, and then we can turn to the other question. This is the most esoteric question yet. You know, giving them mandatory jurisdiction, what’s, are you, what is going to prevent them from dealing with mandatory jurisdiction like they used to with one-sentence rulings?
So, nothing immediately, right, but the way Congress wins battles with the Supreme Court is iteratively, right, is that, you know, if the court busts the first statute, you pass the second statute. I mean, we’ve been here with Guantanamo, right, so Congress passes the Detainee Treatment Act to try to strip jurisdiction over the Guantanamo cases. We all know that’s what Congress meant to do.
The court says in Hamdan, you didn’t really mean to do this. Congress goes back and says, oh, yes, we frickin’ did, right, and then, like, that was the normal for them, how this worked.
(35:27) This is really my last question. This is relevant to something I’m writing on, and I know that in some testimony, you said you weren’t sure, so I just want to ask you, does Congress have the power to require explanations in decisions and length of explanation?
I’m really not sure.
Yeah, I’m not either.
So, like, I, my uncertainty has not hardened, or it’s hardened, it has not resolved.
It’s a tough question, actually.
So, it’s a tough question, I mean, from a doctrinal perspective, here’s something for the Fed Courts students in the room, I really think it depends on how you read Klein, what is the rule of Klein, right, like, I’ve always understood, how does it, has Klein, so, I’ve always thought that U.S. v. Klein was basically a commandeering principle, an anti-commandeering principle, that what Congress can’t do is commandeer judicial power. I’m not, that is not the consensus view of United States v. Klein, but it resonates.
And so, in that universe, right, this is why, I write about this in the book, this is why, for example, Scalia was opposed to the legislation that would have stopped the court from consulting foreign and international sources when interpreting the Constitution. He said, I don’t think we should, but I certainly don’t think Congress can tell us not to. Right, I see the sort of, you have to write, and you have to write this much, and you have to disclose votes, as all being of a piece with those concerns, which I share.
I also think they’re not necessary, right, a world in which Congress is codifying standards of review, and is being very clear, say, contra Justice Kavanaugh’s footnote and his CASA concurrence, that different types of relief have different standards, and these are the standards. A world in which Congress says it’s actually not irreparable harm for purposes of your appellate statutory power, just that the government was blocked by a district court. Like, those are things I think Congress unquestionably can do, and I think they have a much more direct and salutary effect.
So, I don’t know what the full list is, but I have to say, I like these reforms a lot better than what some of your progressive friends are proposing to the court.
Well, and my progressive friends are pretty mad at me.
And they’re mad at you, I know. Okay, all right.












