Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith discuss the administration’s warnings that Democratic lawmakers’ planned oversight could merit criminal investigation, including letters from a U.S. attorney in Texas directing members of Congress to preserve documents. Bauer and Goldsmith agree that there is no legal basis for such an investigation, debate the importance of some Democrats’ potentially imprudent rhetoric about planned oversight in light of the limits described by the Court in Mazars, and consider what the administration may hope to gain from the warnings. They close by weighing whether Will Scharf’s conduct as White House counsel, including his letter to the incoming House Oversight chair, bears out the criticism that the office is too political and strengthens the case for shrinking it.
Mentioned:
Will Scharf, “Letter to Rep. Robert Garcia” (Office of White House Counsel, November 9, 2026)
Aaron Reitz, “Letter to Sen. Adam Schiff,” “Letter to Rep. Robert Garcia,” “Letter to Sen. Elizabeth Warren,” “Letter to Sen. Elissa Slotkin,” and “Letter to Sen. Richard Blumenthal” (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas, November 11-18)
“Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,” 591 U.S. 848 (Supreme Court of the United States, July 9, 2020)
Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith, After Trump: Reconstructing the Presidency (Lawfare Press, September 15, 2020)
This is an edited transcript of an episode of “Executive Functions Chat.” You can listen to the full conversation by following or subscribing to the show on Substack, Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
Jack Goldsmith: Good morning, Bob.
Bob Bauer: Good morning, Jack.
Since the Democrats swept the midterm elections, they’ve pledged to aggressively investigate the Trump administration and its allies when they take control of Congress next year. Trump administration officials have responded by threatening to investigate the Democrats. President Trump ordered the Justice Department to look into what he called threats [from] Democratic lawmakers. Attorney General Blanche and White House Counsel Will Scharf suggested that some of these alleged threats could be crimes. And the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Texas, Aaron Reitz, has sent demand letters to several Democratic lawmakers directing them to preserve documents in advance of a potential criminal inquiry into their oversight plans. And of course, all of these things were broadcast widely on social media.
So today we’re going to discuss the legal basis, if any, for these warnings by the administration, whether they’re a prelude or a bluff, and what they suggest about how the new Congress should proceed with its oversight investigations. So let’s start, Bob, with how extraordinary are these statements from the administration, from the White House and DOJ?
They are extraordinary. I don’t know anybody who would argue to the contrary. It’s remarkable for the administration to claim that Democrats, in seeking to exercise these investigative and oversight functions, relying primarily on their rhetoric, but nonetheless referring to those functions as illegitimate, are threatening them with crimes [by] pursuing this function. It is extraordinary. There’s no question about it.
Is there any legal basis for it? Is there any basis for a criminal investigation, in your view?
No, there is not. Absolutely not. I don’t know of anybody yet in the legal community who has expressed the view that the administration has a case here. And we can discuss at length why it wouldn’t have a case. But again, this relates to how extraordinary it is. I don’t know any factual or legal foundation for the administration threatening, much less initiating, an investigation of Congress as it sets about performing these oversight and investigative functions.
Okay, for what it’s worth, I agree with you completely. I think there’s no basis for a criminal investigation. And the threats strike me as wrong and misplaced, and we can talk about what goals they purport to serve in a moment. I do want to say, though, that I think that some Democrats in Congress have acted imprudently in suggesting that they may want to engage in these investigations for purposes of punishment, or to engage in some form of law enforcement, et cetera. The Supreme Court has made clear that those are improper purposes. It’s called them indefensible bases for congressional investigations.
I don’t think that’s a basis for criminal threats. I also don’t think it’s ultimately going to affect Congress’s power to exercise oversight, for a whole bunch of reasons. It does strike me as imprudent and contrary to what the Supreme Court has said is appropriate. Do you agree with that?
Not entirely, in this sense. Setting aside whether or not any particular political rhetoric is well-judged or sort of prudent in the broad sense, I don’t think—and I don’t think we disagree on this point—that it reflects in any way on the legal position of the Congress in pursuing these oversight functions. I would strongly distinguish between rhetoric on the one hand, which typically is bare-knuckled, and the actual conduct of the oversight process, the particular issues that they’re setting out to investigate.
For example, President Trump’s very worked up about investigation of donations by large interests, corporate interests and wealthy individuals, to the ballroom. That’s a completely legitimate oversight function. Now, the rhetoric that accompanies those demands for information may strike some people as over the top. Maybe they believe that, maybe they don’t. But the issue is whether or not there is a legitimate legislative purpose behind the inquiry into the ballroom donations, and I think unquestionably there is.
(3:51) I completely agree with that, but let me just read to you from the Mazars decision in the Supreme Court. Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purposes of law enforcement, may not use subpoenas to try someone before a committee for any crime or wrongdoing. There is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. Investigations conducted solely for personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigated are indefensible.
My point is not—I agree with everything you just said. My point is that some of the rhetoric, which has been heated, about punishment, deterrence, et cetera, plays into the administration’s efforts to treat this as political and illegitimate, because they’re going to be quoting this statement from Mazars and placing congressional Democratic statements next to it. Do you think there’s anything to that point?
I think it may serve their political purposes, specifically speaking to their own committed base. But Mazars also acknowledges that frequently these conflicts between the executive and the legislature are intensely partisan or political in nature. And that’s just an acknowledgment of the reality of that relationship over time. And so you would expect that kind of rhetoric.
And so, again—I’m obviously repeating the point—people may make of the rhetoric what they will, but the legal inquiry here, and all of this goes to the enforceability of Congress’s demand for information, the legal inquiry is going to be resolutely focused on the nature of the inquiry, not on what individual members may say their ultimate intention is.
By the way, I just want to make one quick note about law enforcement. That’s true in one sense, obviously. In the most basic sense, it’s true that Congress doesn’t have a law enforcement function in the strict sense of the term. It is not unusual, however—in fact, it’s standard—for Congress controlled by either party to, when it obtains evidence of criminal conduct, identify it as such and then refer it for prosecution. Now, that’s obviously something of a fool’s errand, if you will, in the case of this Justice Department, which is not going to receive even legitimate evidence of criminal misconduct and follow up on it. But it’s not quite true that Congress doesn’t have an interest in seeing the crimes that it uncovers in the oversight function are addressed appropriately in the criminal justice process.
I agree with that. I think we’re talking about different things. I mean, my question is how this is going to play out politically. So why don’t we move to that? I mean, what is the purpose of the administration making these threats? One view I have about the Trump administration is whenever it is getting very loud and thumping its chest about how much power it has to do bad things, that often means that it doesn’t have a leg to stand on. They tend to ramp up the rhetoric and then there’s often nothing there. And I think that’s true in this case in terms of their ability to use the criminal process successfully to deter or halt these investigations. So what is the point?
Without knowing precisely what conversations led to this within the executive branch, it could, first of all, reflect the kind of leadership that Stephen Miller plans to bring to the White House: a hell-no-we-won’t-go, fight-to-the-last-drop, ends-justifying-the-means White House leadership. So in part, this has the stamp of the arrival of a new chief of staff.
It is—and Trump has made this clear in some of his tweets—a little bit of a message, maybe, to the private sector. Democrats have emphasized bringing private entities, corporations, donors, and the like into the oversight process for purposes of obtaining the information they want. They view that as potentially a much easier road to obtain the information than fighting the administration inconclusively in Congress and then seeing that fight go to the courts. And the administration may be trying to send a signal to organizations that believe they will be swept up in this process that the administration is going to fight to the death and they should do the same. In fact, in one of Trump’s tweets, he asked private entities to let the Department of Justice know if they’re being harassed. So that may be a second objective here.
I don’t think it’s being very effectively executed. And we might focus on how odd the behavior of the U.S. attorney in Texas is, and how meaningless legally it is. But that may be another objective.
(7:53) So talk about the oddness of the U.S. attorney in Texas. He’s basically been sending threatening letters to members of Congress asking them to preserve records. Orin Kerr said that there’s no basis for such a request in the context of a criminal investigation, that those are civil investigation propositions. But setting that aside, what do you make of what he’s doing?
Apparently, they found a U.S. attorney who is willing, in Texas, to issue these threats, and he seems to be prepared to double and triple down on them. I mean, the Orin Kerr comment is reflective of the overall point that the legal position that he’s taking is utterly preposterous. I mean, it’s just crazy, if you will. And now, of course, he’s become the center of controversy. A bar complaint has been filed against him by a nonprofit group. And he, in turn, has attacked the nonprofit group for filing the bar complaint.
But what you have is a multi-pronged attack by this administration. I do want to say one thing about the attorney general’s involvement in this. Trump has insisted that this oversight conduct has criminal implications for members of Congress. Blanche, who I think has been engaged in a bit of gaslighting on this point, has both endorsed that view but also seemed to step back from it. He’s doing a bit of a dance around this. You have the White House counsel suggesting that his office, as well as the DOJ, will be involved in monitoring Congress. And then you have the U.S. attorney, who I suppose is meant to be sort of the formal tip of the legal spear here.
So it looks like it’s coordinated. And Blanche has not—to be clear, he’s not disavowed what Reitz has done here. He has said he doesn’t monitor what his U.S. attorneys do on a day-to-day basis. But he has spoken highly of Reitz, and he’s certainly not doing anything to shut it down. And I think everybody familiar with the way DOJ operates understands that if Blanche wanted to call Reitz off, he could, and would be effective in doing so.
Certainly, that’s true. What do you make of the contents of the letters?
They really have to be read to be believed. I won’t go into great detail. On one level, for example, he’s citing civil rights statutes as a defense against an inquiry into whether billionaires were buying influence with the administration by donating to the ballroom. That’s a curious civil rights sort of stand to take. And secondly, he wants to do everything he can to detoxify or prettify what may have taken place by referring to this ballroom activity as associational activities related to philanthropic projects. So, for example, if somebody very wealthy decides, either to protect their policy position or to advance it, to give a huge amount of money to the administration for a presidential vanity project, that’s a constitutionally protected associational activity related to a philanthropic project. It’s comical.
(10:36) So there’s just no doubt that there’s going to be a legal conflagration of sorts come January. Congress is going to be issuing masses of subpoenas. The administration is going to be going to the mat to resist. There’s going to be a legal track and there’s going to be a political track.
The legal track: the basic questions, it seems to me—and this is from 40,000 feet—are, one, how long will it take to vindicate enforcement of the subpoenas, to the extent that that can be successful against various parties, public and private? The second is, to the extent that interim orders are going to matter, and those are going to go to the Supreme Court quickly, how will the court rule? That strikes me as the legal track.
The political track—I mean, how do you see the political track playing out? The Trump administration, they’re clearly going to try to make what the Democrats are doing look like illegitimate lawfare. That strikes me as a little bit of a dangerous strategy if there’s lots of evidence of corruption coming out, which is obviously something that all the polls indicate there’s very high concern about in the country. How do you see it on the political track playing out?
My own sense, because this has been developing since Trump 1.0, is that the administration is just going to put its foot on the pedal and go as fast and hard at the Congress as it possibly can. What’s striking about the Mazars case, rereading it now, some years after it was issued, is the court there speaks wistfully of the accommodation process that was once in effect between the two branches, even in the most heated conflicts over whether Congress had a legitimate purpose in oversight, whether the executive was validly asserting privileges of one kind or another. But eventually some agreement was reached.
That is not something that the administration—the Trump administration 1.0—indicated it was particularly interested in. And here we have a superheated example of how much it is rejecting the accommodation course that has characterized even the most heated conflicts between the branches for the better part of our history. And I think that’s the direction this is going: absolute, 100 percent defiance and potential weaponized use of the law enforcement process to harass individual members of Congress for participating in this oversight function. It’s not impossible to imagine that that could happen.
I agree. The administration thinks it’s going to gain advantage from doing that, or at least that’s what it appears to be signaling. Is there any plausible basis for that view? I guess one question is what will happen with Republicans in Congress and how they will view what’s going on. The administration clearly thinks there’s going to be an advantage from raising the heat on this and painting the Democrats as doing something illegitimate, and even using perhaps the criminal process to go after them. I’m not sure I understand the political strategy there.
One thing we haven’t touched on, which could account for that political strategy in part, is there may be activities in the history of the last two years the administration is hell-bent on not having Congress uncover. And we talk about the politics of this, but there may also be a necessity of an all-out defense against, for example, an inquiry into the president’s extraordinary acquisition of wealth while in office, the extraordinary acquisition of wealth by his family in office, with clear-cut—in fact, in some cases, as in crypto, acknowledged—overlap between the conduct of the office, or the use of official property or his name or his influence, and the acquisition of this wealth.
And so it may be—just to bring that back to the fore—an absolute necessity for them to pursue this course of action, as damaging and ultimately fruitless as I think it will be, and fruitless in the sense that they’re not going to stop the Congress from doing this.
(14:19) Let me close by asking you about the White House counsel. You were President Obama’s counsel. You and I wrote about the White House counsel in our book After Trump, and about what an unusual role it was, about how it was—basically, the White House counsel offers legal advice in a highly political context. We actually proposed in our book that the White House Counsel’s Office be shrunk because of that intermixture of law and politics.
Will Scharf here is playing a very aggressive role in protecting the administration’s interest. At some level of generality, that’s what all White House counsels do. Do you have any comments on Scharf’s discharge of his functions as White House counsel? How do you see it?
Critics have said in the past—and I’ve thought sometimes the criticism has been overdrawn, and now I think I may have been wrong—that the office is just simply too political. The White House counsel is a member of the senior staff, is chosen sort of for loyalty and physical and other proximity to the president. And when the White House counsel behaves just like that, those criticisms are validated.
I mean, for the White House counsel to issue threats on White House counsel stationery to members of Congress—threats to hold them criminally accountable for conducting their oversight and investigative functions—utilizing the same rhetoric that you might hear from other members of the White House, or in the communications and political departments, it simply underscores that this office is not a legal office.
And so I think the criticisms have received a real boost from the conduct of Scharf and other White House counsels before him. But in his case, I think that he’s really accelerating in a direction that could ultimately mean, at some point, the White House Counsel’s Office just should be something of the past—that presidents should be under some pressure to disband the White House Counsel’s Office, or have a small contingent of lawyers who advise narrowly on legal issues that directly affect the executive branch but don’t become involved, as this White House counsel is becoming involved, in this kind of conflict, making the kinds of threats or threatening to exercise the kind of authority that he’s threatening to exercise.
Okay, to be fair to Scharf, he would probably say that he wasn’t issuing threats. I mean, he said this might go into criminality and might warrant investigation. I agree he crossed lines. I’ve looked into this. There’s never been a White House counsel’s even intimation of a criminal response to a House oversight investigation.
But let me also say that, again, we propose shrinking the White House counsel in our book. I predict that every president will resist that strongly, because the White House counsel plays such an important part of any administration’s engagement in politics. And it’s just such a crucial role that I don’t see a president giving that up. And it’s kind of hard for me to see how Congress could shrink it itself. Do you have any thoughts on that?
Well, one thought I do have on that is how this whole decision-making process, how this debate, has changed now that we have an administration clearing the way for future presidents, if future presidents choose to follow the same course in whole or in part, to actually have the DOJ become highly politicized. The norms that used to insulate the DOJ to some extent from presidential control, the norms that protected federal law enforcement from politicization, have crumbled in this administration to nothing.
And if that’s the case, why worry about having a political consigliere in the White House? You can make the political consigliere the attorney general. And that’s, in fact, what we have today: these multiple indictments of enemies of the president, sort of open, brazen, unapologetic. Who needs a White House counsel? Maybe you might want to have a lawyer in the building on hand to address issues that the president doesn’t want to have to worry about communicating across town—only a few blocks, in fact—with the attorney general about. But why worry about having a political consigliere when the AG has become one?
Maybe two consiglieres are better than one.
That could be the case.
Thanks, Bob.
Thank you.












