The Second Most Consequential Unilateral Use of Force in American History
The Iran war is a new low in the deterioration of Congress’s check on presidential war
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The Constitution’s framers clearly aimed to check “the Dog of war,” in Jefferson’s phrase, by ensuring that Congress had a say before a president could commit the United States to a large-scale military conflict.
Whether the framers did so as a matter of constitutional law or constitutional politics, and whether the mechanism was the Declare War Clause or Congress’s control over military appropriations, remains contested. But there’s no doubt that the aim was to ensure a democratic check on unilateral presidential military adventurism.
President Trump’s congressionally unauthorized military action in Iran is not, of course, the first time the framers’ aims have been thwarted. But just one month in, Operation Epic Fury is already among the most consequential unauthorized presidential uses of force in all of American history—probably the second most consequential, after the Korean War. It’s also a new nadir in the decline of Congress’s check on presidential war.
Past Wars
By “consequential,” we mean in terms of geopolitical, military, and economic impact. Our focus on congressionally unauthorized action excludes the five declared American wars and the important conflicts that Congress did authorize—for example, post-Tonkin Vietnam, Iraq I and II, and the post-9/11 “war on terrorism.”
The only unilateral presidential action clearly more consequential than Iran (at least thus far) is President Harry Truman’s controversial and groundbreaking unilateral decision in 1950 to join the fight on the Korean Peninsula. (William Rehnquist in 1970 called it “the high water mark of executive action without express congressional approval,” and it remains so today.)
That major and very dangerous Cold War standoff lasted several years and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties on the American side alone. Truman sent U.S. troops into the battle without congressional authorization, though Congress later arguably authorized it through appropriations to arm and equip the military.
One might also include as a comparison pre-Gulf of Tonkin Vietnam, which laid the ground for the long and very consequential (and later authorized) Vietnam War, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “undeclared” naval war in the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor. Others may think that the Bay of Pigs, a covert action, should also be included in the close comparisons. And of course, Lincoln’s initial response to the southern rebellion was unauthorized but that was a response to domestic insurrection and was sui generis.
The most famous humanitarian interventions—Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya—pale in significance to the Iran war. Several unilateral military actions (e.g. Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama) involved more U.S. casualties (compared to current numbers from Iran) but were much less consequential. (In 1982-1983 in Lebanon, four American Marines on a unilateral presidential mission were killed in hostile fire and several dozen wounded before Congress authorized the mission (and then 241 service members were killed a few weeks later)).
Two caveats to our claim: First, as noted, the post-9/11 war against Islamist terrorists was mostly authorized but some actions by presidents in this period were done pursuant to Article II alone. It’s hard to separate out the Article II aspects and consider them discretely in terms of consequence.
Second, one might see the current unauthorized conflict with Iran as part of a much longer persistent low-level unauthorized armed conflict with Iran dating back to 1979. The United States in this period engaged in numerous attacks on Iranian officials or proxies. And those proxies killed or wounded many hundreds of American service members between 1979 and Feb. 28 of this year.
This War
The current Iran campaign is notable not just due to the massive global consequences of Trump’s unilateral decision, or due to the mercurial and improvisational way that Trump has conducted it, but also due to his attitude toward Congress.
Compare Truman’s engagement with Congress on Korea. He did not seek congressional permission and his administration was insistent on its unprecedented claims of unilateral power to use large-scale force in that context. Yet though Truman joined the war “without deep consultation with Congress,” he was thereafter (out of prudence, if nothing else) more respectful than Trump about congressional equities.
Once the war began, Truman met personally with members of Congress and he and his administration consulted and kept them informed. Three and a half weeks into the conflict Truman sent Congress a long message explaining his actions and seeking congressional support for specified items through appropriations and other legislative actions to “increase the production of essential materials, products, and services” related to the war.
The Trump administration has briefed Congress about the war. But the briefings have lacked information and constancy. Even Republicans are complaining about the paucity of information about the war’s objectives and costs, about how it is being conducted, and whether ground troops will be needed.
“We want to know more about what’s going on, what the options are, and why they’re being considered,” complained House Armed Services Committee chair Rep. Mike Rogers last week. “And we’re just not getting enough answers on those questions.” And the Trump administration still has not sought any form of official congressional support for the war, including appropriations.
There is a direct connection, we think, between the absence of real consultation with Congress, before or since the conflict began, and the volatility with which the administration has conducted the war. This is not necessarily because congressional leaders have great military insight (though some may). It is because the need to justify and explain to government leaders outside the presidential bubble might have surfaced the many problems that have become apparent over the last month and counseled a steadier course.
The Iran conflict thus marks a new low in the deterioration of Congress’s check on presidential war unilateralism. The president has effectively dismissed the need for serious engagement with Congress even for this large-scale conflict that has scrambled alliances, rattled energy and financial markets, and drawn the entire world into crisis. And he has made a joke of it. In a statement that mocked his lawyers and taunted Congress, the president kidded that he should avoid saying “war”—the term he and senior officials have regularly used—because “you’re supposed to get approval.”
But, and it is a meaningful “but,” Trump will soon have to ask Congress for appropriations to support this very expensive war. This is the one constitutional check that he must face. Soldiers, defense contractors, and others must be paid.
Appropriations are the point at which Congress can and must hold the administration to account for its unilateral decision to go to war. Will Congress cut off funds for the war? (Highly doubtful.) Will it impose conditions on the use of the funds, including, possibly, greater informational transparency or time limits? Will it be more ambitious about constraining future uses of force in the region? Appropriations are the point that Congress joins the president in owning the war.
Thanks to Vishnu Kannan and Tia Sewell for assistance