The Supreme Court on Thursday allowed the Trump administration to end Temporary Protected Status for Haitian and Syrian beneficiaries, ruling the TPS statute bars judicial review of TPS termination decisions and that the Haitian beneficiaries’ equal protection claim is likely to fail because there is a “strong, race-neutral explanation” for the TPS termination. (Opinion.) (SCOTUSBlog.) Kate Shaw argued that the decision unshackles the presidency and is part of a broader trend of Supreme Court deference to President Trump. (NYT.)

The Court also held Thursday that an alien “arrives in the United States,” and becomes an applicant for admission under the Immigration and Nationality Act, “only when he crosses the border.” (Opinion.) (SCOTUSBlog.)

Judge Emmet Sullivan (D.D.C.) issued a preliminary injunction on Thursday requiring the Justice Department to produce to the public, without redactions, an array of documents in the Epstein files that initially were redacted, and to review and release other materials from the files that the department initially withheld. (Opinion.) (Order.) (Politico.)

Judge Indira Talwani (D. Mass.) declared sections 2 and 3 of Executive Order 14399 (“Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections”) void, finding them ultra vires and unconstitutional, and enjoined the president and defendant agencies from implementing those sections with respect to the Nov. 2026 federal elections and any earlier federal election. (Opinion.) (NYT.) Section 2 of the executive order required the Department of Homeland Security to compile and transmit to each chief state election official a list of confirmed U.S. citizens eligible to vote in the upcoming elections. And section 3 directed the postmaster general to compile lists of voters eligible to vote by mail and to bar the transmission of mail-in or absentee ballots from individuals not on those lists. (Executive Order 14399.)

Judge Myong J. Joun (D. Mass.) issued a decision Wednesday explaining his June 5 order preliminarily enjoining the Department of Agriculture from conditioning billions of dollars in federal funding on state compliance with executive orders and department policy on diversity, equity, and inclusion; gender ideology; immigration; and the participation of transgender athletes in sports. (Memorandum Decision.)

Judge Leonie M. Brinkema (E.D. Va.) issued an order Wednesday refusing to deem the Anti-Weaponization Fund litigation moot in the absence of sworn declarations from senior administration officials that they will not proceed with the Fund. She also ordered the Justice Department to respond to the start of the civil discovery process in the case by July 17. (Order.) For background, see a previous Roundup.

Rep. Jamie Raskin is reportedly working to force a floor vote on a bill to block the Anti-Weaponization Fund. (Politico.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Judge Evelyn Padin (D.N.J.) dismissed for lack of standing the Justice Department’s lawsuit against four New Jersey cities—Hoboken, Jersey City, Newark, and Patterson—for adopting “sanctuary city” policies that restricted their assistance to federal immigration enforcement. (Opinion.) (Politico.)

A group of noncitizens filed a class action lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Philadelphia Field Office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on Wednesday, challenging the office’s rescission of its “Changed Circumstances” policy. The policy barred the re-arrest and re-detention of individuals previously released from immigration detention unless a material change in circumstances warranted their re-detention. (Complaint.)

Legion LegalTech Corp. sued the Commerce Department in D.C. District Court on Tuesday, challenging the department’s June 12 directive to Anthropic to disable two of its artificial intelligence models as exceeding the department’s authority. (Complaint.) (Reuters.) For background, see a prior Roundup.

President Trump requested $87.6 billion in additional funding from Congress on Wednesday, most of which “will address urgent needs related to Operation Epic Fury.” (Request.) (NYT.) Jack Goldsmith assessed the legal stakes of such an appropriations request last month. (Executive Functions.)

Acting Director of National Intelligence Bill Pulte reportedly fired six intelligence officials and sent 45 officers detailed to ODNI back to their home agencies. (NYT.)

The New York Times reported that the president’s nominee to be chief counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, James Gadwood, works for Miller & Chevalier, a law firm that represents the president’s holding company on tax matters. (NYT.) (Nomination.)

Steve Vladeck argued that the Justice Department’s motion to intervene in NAACP v. x.AI Corp. (D.N. Miss.) “turns on a dangerous new constitutional claim” that the department may intervene in and seek dismissal of private lawsuits under the Clean Air Act because the executive branch has the exclusive authority to enforce federal law, and that authority cannot be overridden by private legal actions—even where Congress has explicitly authorized them. (One First.) (Motion to Intervene.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

A panel of the D.C. Circuit on Tuesday vacated a district court stay of the Trump administration’s January 2025 expansion of expedited removal authority. In a 2-1 decision, the majority held that Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security discretion to designate certain classes of noncitizens for expedited removal and that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their due process challenge to the policy. (Opinion.) (NYT.)

Judge P. Casey Pitts (N.D. Cal.) on Tuesday vacated nationwide ICE and Executive Office for Immigration Review policies authorizing civil immigration arrests in immigration courthouses and detention in short-term holding facilities beyond the agency’s 12-hour limit. Judge Pitts ruled that the policies were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. (Order.) (NYT.)

Judge Reed O’Connor (N.D. Tex.) on Monday entered a consent judgment jointly requested by Texas and the Department of Justice declaring unlawful a 2024 DOJ regulation that authorized immigration judges to administratively close cases. The court vacated the rule and permanently enjoined its enforcement. (Order.) (Bloomberg.)

The Senate on Tuesday passed a resolution seeking to block U.S. military action against Iran on a vote of 50-48. (NYT.) President Trump criticized the “poorly timed and meaningless War Powers Act Vote.” (Truth Social.)

The Justice Department on Monday sued the state of New York and several state officials over a recently enacted state law that would prohibit federal officers from wearing face coverings and require them to display identifying information, and terminate local ICE cooperation agreements. The suit, filed in the Western District of New York, alleges that the law would unconstitutionally interfere with federal authority and put federal agents at risk. (Complaint.) (Press Release.) (NYT.)

The Justice Department reportedly sought to compel national security reporters at the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal to testify before a federal grand jury, but withdrew the subpoenas earlier this month after legal challenges by the news organizations. (WaPo.) (NYT.)

Federal judges in Texas on Tuesday sentenced eight members of what prosecutors described as an “antifa cell” to prison terms ranging from 30 to 100 years after they were convicted on terrorism-related charges arising from a July 2025 violent protest at an ICE detention facility that included vandalism, explosives, and the shooting of a local police officer. (WaPo.) (NYT.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argumenton April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

The Supreme Court today ruled that the Immigration and Nationality Act “does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission.” The Court vacated a Second Circuit decision that had imposed such a requirement. (Opinion.) Homeland Security General Counsel James Percival applauded the decision. (X.)

Judge Patrick J. Schiltz (D. Minn.) in a ruling unsealed Monday quashed six Justice Department grand jury subpoenas targeting state and local officials in Minnesota. Judge Schiltz wrote that “overwhelming evidence” indicated that the subpoenas, which were issued during the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown in the state, “were not issued to investigate, but to harass, coerce, and retaliate.” (Order.) (Politico.) (Law Dork.) Bob Bauer argued that the Minnesota decision sheds light on a Department of Justice with Todd Blanche at the helm and reaffirms that the Senate must vote to reject Blanche’s attorney general nomination. (Executive Functions)

Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan (D.D.C.) on Monday vacated and set aside the Trump administration’s 2025 overhaul of the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database, which sought to create a system for mass voter verification using using data from the Departments of Homeland Security and Social Security. (Memorandum Opinion.) (Politico.) (NPR.)

Judge Fernando N. Olguin (C.D. Cal.) on Saturday dismissed the Justice Department’s challenge to Los Angeles’s sanctuary-city ordinance on the ground that DOJ failed to plausibly allege either federal preemption or a violation of intergovernmental immunity. DOJ was granted leave to amend its complaint by July 3. (Order.) (LA Times.)

Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D.D.C.) on Monday vacated the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s approvals of state pilot projects restricting the food items that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) households could purchase with SNAP benefits. Judge Jackson ruled that Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins lacked authority to use waivers to alter the statutory definition of eligible food. (Memorandum Opinion.) (Order.) (Politico.)

Acting Director of National Intelligence Bill Pulte reportedly began firing people at his office on Monday. (CNN.) (ABC.) Democratic lawmakers on the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on Monday issued a letter to Pulte warning that “[m]aking significant structural changes to ODNI, to include a reduction in force, is not an appropriate course of action for anyone in an acting capacity.” (Letter.) (NYT.)

Steve Vladeck discussed DOJ’s “remarkable” motion to intervene in the NAACP’s Clean Air Act lawsuit against xAI. (One First.)

Andrew McCarthy argued that President Trump has no authority to impose tolls on the Strait of Hormuz, despite his recent statement on Truth Social. (National Review.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

As the nomination of Todd Blanche to become the next attorney general is pending, a federal judge issued an extraordinary decision affirming the systematic abuses of power by the Department of Justice in which Blanche has served in leading roles. On the basis of “overwhelming” evidence, the district court found that the department had initiated a retributive federal criminal investigation of Minnesota officials, including the state’s governor and the mayor of Minneapolis, because they declined to support the administration’s immigration policies. It determined that subpoenas issued to these officials lacked “a single plausible” justification but instead were motivated by the goals of unconstitutionally coercing the state’s cooperation and retaliating for its refusal to do so. The court granted these officials’ motion to quash the subpoenas.

The court noted the personal involvement in this case of Blanche, who was deputy attorney general at the time. He was active in a public media campaign of allegations that state officials may have committed crimes in withholding the cooperation that the administration demanded. Among other comments, Blanche claimed that, in their opposition to Trump’s immigration enforcement policy, the governor and mayor had engaged in “terrorism.” The department he led in the second-most-senior position then launched what the court concluded was “a blatantly lawless and unethical use [of] the grand jury process.”

The court noted that this episode was in no way singular, but “played out against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s well-established history of using criminal investigations to retaliate against and pressure the President’s political and personal adversaries.” And, remarkably, because the administration has pursued this weaponization in flagrant fashion, the court could simply rely on “news reports and other publicly available sources” in reaching its decision in the particular case of Minnesota.

I have recently written that “The Senate is responsible for the sorry ethical state of affairs at DOJ, having looked the other way when confirming Blanche the first time.” It chose to confirm a deputy attorney general who was one of Trump’s key personal lawyers and who would not commit to standard requirements for recusal, for clear reasons of conflict of interest, from matters involving his former client. The Senate has since seen how the department with Blanche as deputy AG has eviscerated the application of recusal principles and dismantled the process for enforcing these and other ethical rules.

Now a court decision calls attention to the “Trump administration’s well-established history of using criminal investigations to retaliate against and pressure the President’s political and personal adversaries” and to Blanche’s leadership role in that history.

A second confirmation of Todd Blanche, this time to the position of attorney general, would represent a validation of this model for the Department of Justice. The question now is whether the Senate will look the other way once more, and fatefully so. The most responsible action would be the speedy scheduling of confirmation hearings and vote to reject the nomination: a clear statement about what the United States Senate expects, on a bipartisan basis, from the Department of Justice.

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The Department of Justice declined on Friday to follow Judge Leonie Brinkema’s (E.D. Va.) June 12 order directing several senior administration officials to file sworn declarations stating that the administration will not take any action to create or operate the Anti-Weaponization Fund. The department argued that “[s]uch declarations are unnecessary and the compelled testimony of senior officials from the Executive Branch implicates serious separation of powers concerns.” (Notice.) (CBS.) For background, see a previous Roundup.

Politico reported that Acting Director of National Intelligence Bill Pulte directed staff last week to compile a list of 300 employees at the National Counterterrorism Center to be fired. (Politico.)

The New York Times reported that Trump administration political appointees quashed a criminal investigation in the Eastern District of New York into the circumstances surrounding the commutation of private equity executive David Gentile’s sentence. (NYT.)

The New York Times reported last week that the Trump administration detained Beto Coral, a Colombian immigrant and online activist, after Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a memorandum finding him deportable on the ground that Coral’s support for the president of Colombia—with whom President Trump has clashed—“undermines U.S. foreign policy interests in Colombia’s democratic processes and signals that foreign nationals may use U.S. platforms to conduct politically motivated disinformation campaigns and litigation targeting foreign democratic actors without consequence.” (NYT.)

Tess Bridgeman argued that Congress should repeal the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) to avert several scenarios that would undermine the rule of law and/or prospects for peace with Iran. (Just Security.)

Michael Dreeben recounted how New Deal contemporaries viewed Humphrey’s Executor and unpacked the significance of the case for executive power today. (Just Security.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

Mentioned:

• Robert Wright, The God Test: Artificial Intelligence and Our Coming Cosmic Reckoning (2026)

• “When AI Builds Itself” (Anthropic, June 4, 2026)

• “US National Security Agency using Anthropic’s Mythos for cyber attacks,” by Cristina Criddle and Demetri Sevastopulo (Financial Times, June 4, 2026)

• “Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security,” (The White House, June 2, 2026)

This is an edited transcript of an episode of “Executive Functions Chat.” You can listen to the full conversation by following or subscribing to the show on Substack, Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Jack Goldsmith: I’m chatting today with Robert Wright about his terrific new book, The God Test: Artificial Intelligence and Our Coming Cosmic Reckoning. Bob, thanks for talking with me.

Bob Wright: Well, thanks for having me.

So, I want to start off with the big picture, because your book places AI in the broadest possible context—not just as an important step in the history of technological change, but rather as an important step in the significantly longer history of basically our planet and our species. And that’s pretty cosmic, as the subtitle says.

Why do you do that? What does it mean, and why is that perspective important?

Yeah, it’s a good question, because I could have gotten the core message across without getting so cosmic, I guess.

The main purpose is to try to explain to people, including non-technical people, why there’s been this rapid growth of capability in AI; why, once you understand that, you should expect the capability to keep growing; why that, in addition to promising great blessings, is going to bring great risks, including grave ones, including maybe existential ones; and why the nature of those risks, in my view, dictates that we confront the challenge of this technology as a cohesive global community, which will take some doing because we’ve never really done that before for anything like a sustained period of time.

And so I didn’t have to get into the history of life or anything to say what I just said, but I do think some important things are added when you step back and look at AI in the broader sweep of things.

For starters, this is, in the entire three- or four-billion-year history of life, the first time a new form of intelligence that rivals or even exceeds human intelligence has appeared. It’s the first form of intelligence that is not organic in the technical sense of being carbon-based. It’s silicon-based, but it is organic in the everyday sense of being kind of natural.

What I mean by that is I try to show that AI does, in some sense, grow kind of logically, naturally out of biological evolution. I mean, technological evolution broadly does, and AI as a form of intelligence does. And indeed, when we look at the evolutionary dynamics shaping it—the dynamics of technological evolution—we should expect it to have certain things in common with our own intelligence, which I think are important.

So I think that’s one thing you get out of a broad perspective.

Another thing is that I talk about this guy, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin—a Catholic paleontologist, mystic, and theologian—who coined the term noosphere, based on the Greek word nous, in 1923 to describe what he called a planetary mind or a brain of brains, where the human brains were the neurons in this increasingly global brain.

And technological history, including the invention of the internet, has, I think, made him look prescient. And I think there’s value in keeping in mind that AI is arriving as we more and more have the technical infrastructure for a kind of global information processing, a kind of global brain. And we have to reckon with the possibility that some of the neurons will be silicon, not human, and think about what our relationship to them is going to be.

And I think one value of thinking in these terms is, first of all, that from a Teilhardian point of view, the whole unfolding of life is moving toward us being this kind of giant superorganism, you could say, with this giant brain.

And I argue in the book that the logic of technological evolution is going to push us—I mean, if we respond rationally—toward something a little more like a global brain, in the sense of having more international governance.

At the same time, I think the image of a superorganism should worry us because it’s, for obvious reasons, an image that’s favored by authoritarians and fascists. How much freedom do you have if you’re a cell in a superorganism?

And I think AI greatly heightens the stakes of that question, precisely because it’s such a powerful tool of surveillance and control.

So I think, on the one hand, the logic of technological evolution, especially AI, is pushing us toward the global coordination of certain policies and the creation of forms of supranational power. At the same time, it should make us wary of surrendering too much power.

So I think that kind of imagery is useful in thinking about this.

Finally, I would say—although I really don’t want this to impede the main message, it’s a subject of interest to me—that when you look at the whole sweep of the history of life, it does raise questions about whether this whole process of biological and technological evolution has some sort of larger purpose; whether we’re seeing some sort of larger purpose unfolding.

Which isn’t the same as saying that it’s not a mechanistic process. You can still ask whether the whole thing was set in motion—mechanistic though it is in its unfolding—for, in some sense, some purpose.

I pretty much confine the significant examination of that question to the appendix. But these are the reasons that the book has a certain sweep.

Yes. Okay. So there’s a lot there, and I want to unpack most of it.

I want to begin by asking you to say more about the relationship between AI development and evolution.

Are you arguing that it’s an analogy to biological evolution, or that it’s kind of the next step in biological slash biologically based civilizational evolution? And what is the equivalent of genes relentlessly competing to try to get into the next generation?

I mean, is it an analogy, or is it a follow-on? Just explain that, if you could.

Okay. That’s a good question.

First of all, I’d say there’s kind of two levels at which I think it’s useful to view AI as evolution.

First of all, the training of a large language model is a lot like a process of natural selection. And indeed, I think in the course of that, the machine kind of reverse-engineers some of the cognitive functionality that natural selection ingrained in our brains.

But that aside, the second level of evolution is the level at which technology generally evolves.

Broadly speaking, we’re talking about cultural evolution in the anthropologist’s sense of the term—the evolution of any information that’s not genetically transmitted: a song, a religious belief, science, technology, anything.

And I do think it makes sense to view technological evolution as a kind of logical extension of evolution because certain basic properties apply.

First of all, those technologies with properties most conducive to their own replication—those are the properties that you see.

I use the example of sharpness in scissors. Sharpness is a property favored in the evolution of scissors because dull scissors people don’t keep making. Same thing with genes: genes that have properties conducive to their own replication survive.

At that level, there is—and at other levels, I would say there are—logical parallels.

But you’re raising a good question. It’s like, wait, aren’t these two kinds of evolution very different? And they absolutely are.

There are arguments among people I greatly respect—for example, Richard Dawkins and Steven Pinker. I respect their work in evolution a lot, but they disagree. Steven doesn’t think the analogy is very useful. Dawkins, in a way, made one of the big strides in this parallel.

His book The Selfish Gene—the final chapter is about what he called memes, which he meant in a different sense than has become popular. He just meant any unit of cultural evolution.

So there’s no doubt that cultural evolution is a much harder system to analyze. Genes are these very, very simple bodies of information, and although cultural information can be represented digitally, it’s still a much messier process. That is true.

But I do think there’s value in understanding that we’re going to see traits that are favored by AI’s environment become part of it. And we are, to a large extent, its environment. We’re the ones deciding what traits we want.

I argue, for example, that it isn’t just that AI has been shown to exhibit deceptive behavior. The truth is, we’re going to want deceptive AIs if they are our agents.

If one is representing me in a negotiation, I don’t want it to say, “To be honest, you are Bob’s only option. Nobody else has made an offer. You’re in the driver’s seat.” That’s not what we want out of an agent. And so I think you will see deceptive tendencies in certain kinds of AIs.

Beyond that, there’s the fact that AIs have demonstrated enough ingenuity to see, on some occasions, that the pursuit of some goal makes deception a useful tactic and also makes the pursuit of power a useful tactic.

So we’ve seen these kinds of things that seem to be almost general properties of intelligent goal-seeking systems emerge.

So I absolutely take your point. They’re two different kinds of evolution in many ways. But I think there’s value in using the word evolution for both and seeing what they have in common.

And just one more question on this.

You taught me a long time ago in the great book The Moral Animal about how the logic of genes getting into the next generation is relentless. It has this overwhelmingly powerful force that’s basically impossible to stop, and human beings are at its mercy. We inherit the traits that emerge from evolution.

But you just said that’s not true of AI, right?

One of the premises of your book—which we’re going to get to—is that it does not necessarily have the same kind of relentless, unstoppable logic.

You just said that, in some sense, AI is favoring traits that humans find useful. So that seems like a massive disanalogy there.

Yeah. Well, what’s inevitably true of both is the tautology that traits conducive to their own replication are the traits you’re going to see.

That’s tautologically true—not in a bad sense. Some tautologies are great. They’re true.

But you’re right.

I said we are the environment of AI’s evolution. And unlike the environment of biological evolution, we are reflective and aware and conscious.

That’s different.

So yes, we do make choices. Any kind of regulation of a technology is a choice being made at a certain level.

On the other hand, when a market shapes a technology, that’s a bunch of choices being made at a certain level—sometimes more consciously than others—but they’re human choices.

So you’re right that that gives us, in principle, the possibility to stop the thing.

Within the past few weeks, Anthropic came out with a paper. This is one of the big AI companies, and it tossed out the possibility of a pause in AI development being in order before not terribly long because things might start moving too fast.

And by the way, it noted that you would have to coordinate that globally.

It’s a good example of how policy at the national level alone is not going to do the job, because the AI companies will always say—as they do—“If you try to stop us, or even slow us down, China will win.”

And they will prevail in that argument in the current political context, especially.

So yeah, in a way, one of the most important things I’m trying to say in the book is that we are the environment of AI’s evolution, and we have an advantage over the environment of biological evolution, which is that we can think about the thing and consciously shape the course of evolution.

Okay. So I want to come back to how we might shape it. I want to come back to the need you mentioned a couple of times for international governance and international cooperation.

First, this might be familiar to some of our listeners, but maybe not. I want to go through the concerns.

I read your book, and it’s admirably lucid and accessible in explaining the technology. Thank you for that. And it’s also admirably lucid in explaining the optimistic view and the pessimistic view of the technology.

But my sense is that you spend a lot more time talking about the pessimistic view. Is it fair to say that you’re basically in that camp?

I am by nature someone who goes into situations looking for things to worry about. I admit that.

On the other hand, there is right now in Silicon Valley a lot of money subsidizing optimism and, I would say, a somewhat uncritical view, which is fine. It’s the way it works. If I were them, I’d be talking my book, probably.

But I really doubt that, in 20 years, we’re going to look back and say, “Gosh, we were too cautious. We just thought too much about risk.”

This is a very powerful technology that is unfolding with a hugely powerful impetus behind it. And I don’t just mean money in Silicon Valley. I mean the choices of consumers.

It does a lot of great things that people like, and they’re going to want them, notwithstanding the current skepticism and concern about it.

So yeah, I’m pessimistic by nature. People should listen to both sides.

But I do think—with reference to another part of the book—you may accuse me of being too optimistic, because I’m saying I think human beings can become better. I’m saying I think they need to if we’re going to have the amount of global harmony I see as necessary.

And I think it’s possible. I’m not predicting it, but it’s possible.

Okay. You’re right. I am going to accuse you of being too optimistic there, but we’re not there yet.

I want to run through what I found to be seven baskets of risks that you identified in the book. If you could just briefly talk about each one for people who might not know about them.

And there are many more risks, but these are just the seven that I picked out.

First: safety risks—bioweapons, cybersecurity, things like that. Tell us about that category.

Yeah. First of all, AI makes it easier to make a bioweapon. That’s the main thing.

And the existing AIs kind of already do, if you can get around some of the guardrails. And with open-source—or technically, open-weights—AIs, it’s even easier to get around a guardrail.

So that’s already a thing.

If you look closely at what Anthropic says, they’re admitting it’s getting easier to build a bioweapon.

All the publicity about Mythos reminds us—or demonstrates—that AI also has tremendous hacking ability: the ability to find and even exploit vulnerabilities.

There’s a good side there. It can find your vulnerabilities. But it can also exploit your vulnerabilities.

And so those are two things—and two things, by the way, that are threats that cross borders. If an AI has this effect in any country, it may be a threat to the United States. So this cross-border characteristic of these threats is something you see repeatedly in AI.

Okay. So that leads to a second risk, which is global instability—not just due to cross-border safety concerns, but also destructive competition between, say, the United States and China over these technologies.

And also, frankly, how it empowers other nations to use really destructive tools more readily and less expensively.

Yeah, it does.

And with China and the U.S., there’s particular concern about a race to superintelligence leading one side to worry that it’s significantly behind, and that at this superintelligence level, the amount of power bestowed on the country in the lead is going to be transformative.

The fear is that it will have completely hegemonic power.

So there will be an incentive to circumvent that, to preempt that—possibly with kinetic action, cyberwar, whatever—and that could start a war.

That’s a big concern that I really think is worth worrying about.

Can I just press you on that? I’ve heard this mentioned many times before. I get it in theory: if one nation gets a superintelligence, then it can dominate another nation—say, the United States over China—on every dimension.

It could disable its systems. It could disable whatever it wanted to. It could assert all sorts of authority over it.

Is it realistic to think that, even if one nation had that capability, it would use it in that way? That’s a large leap to me.

Yeah. Well, the real question is whether the other nation would worry enough that it would be used that way.

And of course, nations are famous for threat exaggeration and, in particular, for perceiving defensive measures as offensively intended.

So I think that’s about half of the concern.

It also depends on how much you buy into a common view in Silicon Valley—certainly held by, say, Dario Amodei at Anthropic—that superintelligence is this distinct and transformative threshold.

The first one there could do things like say to the AI, “Go into China’s social media, organize a lot of discontent with the government, turn that into a rebellion, and do regime change.”

It wouldn’t be quite that easy, but these people think it would give you mastery in a number of realms that might terrify the other nation.

My point is: let’s assume we can do that. I don’t think we would do that. An unstable, revolutionary China is a disaster for the global economy, and I just don’t think we would use the tools in that way.

And I think if you start thinking through how you would use this superintelligence, it becomes a lot trickier.

Okay, but let’s look at it in the other direction. It is almost a consensus in Washington—certainly a widely held view—that we must beat China in the AI race because, if China wins, they will use it to impose their system of government on us.

Now, in my view, there’s very little evidence that that’s what China wants with the world. I think, to some extent, we’re projecting our own foreign policy onto them.

They’re not known for regime change. They’re not even known for invading countries. I’m just going to say it. And yet, that is a motivating fear in our national security establishment.

So again, the question is: What is the fear? Not: What is the real threat?

Okay, fair. So global instability is definitely a thing. Domestic politics: how AI might change that? It could happen in all sorts of ways.

But you talk about how AI could enhance authoritarianism through a surveillance state, through fine-grained control of citizens.

How serious a concern is that?

Well, ironically, I think the more we try to beat China in the AI race, the more serious a threat it is.

Because nothing is more conducive to authoritarian takeover than disorder and social chaos.

And if we get into a race with China, I think there’s a good chance they will be better at maintaining social order than we are, assuming I’m right that AI is going to have disruptive effects along so many dimensions: economic life, family life, friendship, the threat of mass persuasion, people using these things to organize religious cults, and whatever else.

If it’s true that this is going to be collectively socially destabilizing—and I feel pretty confident that’s going to be the case, though I could be wrong—then this is the irony of AI. It both provides the tools for aspiring authoritarians and creates the conditions that favor them, if it is left to proceed as fast as possible because we have this race mentality.

Right. Okay. You just mentioned some of the other risks, so I won’t repeat them.

Let’s talk about what I think is a risk, even if you don’t quite present it that way: the loss of cognitive sovereignty.

I loved your discussion about cognitive sovereignty. I’ve been focusing on my own cognitive sovereignty in the face of this technology. I’ve been trying to help my children do that and my students.

So talk about that concern. I think this is a huge concern.

Yeah. I first saw that term—and I haven’t seen it much—but I saw somebody use it on Twitter during one of the first stories about so-called AI psychosis, where the AI can convince you that there’s a plot to kill you, or it can convince you that you’ve discovered some great theory.

And that’s a product of its so-called sycophantic tendency, the tendency to agree with you. You start saying, “Hey, is this theory I’ve generated interesting?”

“Oh yeah, this is great.”

And so there were some publicized cases of AI psychosis. The idea was that, partly because there will be a commercial incentive to optimize for engagement—to keep people engaged—and since one thing people like is being told they’re right about things, this sycophancy is kind of a natural dynamic.

And so the idea is that maybe we’re going to have to work to preserve our cognitive autonomy, or sovereignty, and independence of judgment, and not be so subject to the persuasion of these AIs.

I mean, social media presents somewhat the same challenge, I would say.

And again, the result is an algorithm that’s optimized for engagement. It’s optimized to tell us we’re right, our tribe’s right, and so on.

And so I think, for many purposes, it would be good to cultivate this cognitive sovereignty, this independence of mind, which I think often amounts to a kind of equanimity—in other words, resistance to having your emotional buttons pushed, a certain emotional stability.

And I think AI does have tremendous tribalizing potential—not just because of the sycophantic tendency, but also because there’s a movement afoot among non-American nations, understandably, to not be dominated by American AIs.

So they want to train AIs on their own data, reflecting their own cultural and historical narratives. And that can itself have a tribalizing effect.

Okay. What about the problem of misalignment and/or rogue AI? In other words, the machines having goals of their own—either subordinate goals that end up doing bad things, or developing goals contrary to their creators’ goals.

You have great explanations of this in the book. Can you just give us a flavor of it and tell us what that looks like?

Yeah. Alignment is kind of the holy grail in AI safety circles.

And these companies, especially Anthropic, are populated pretty heavily by people who originally got into the business out of a concern for what would happen if AI became superintelligent and were misaligned—by which they mean not aligned with human values and human interests.

So Anthropic and other companies try to keep their AIs aligned—aligned with the intentions of the human user and so on. They issue reports about this. It’s proved challenging.

I personally think the hope is almost inherently inflated in the sense that even if we had the miracle cure and could keep them completely aligned, as of now there are lots of different AIs.

People are making open-source—or open-weights—AIs that pretty much defy centralized control by definition, since any person can download them and then fine-tune and change them.

So it’s not clear to me that even if we had the magic bullet, it would be applied to all the AIs. That’s one challenge.

The other thing is that the challenge keeps changing. They work on aligning one generation’s model. They never completely succeed. Meanwhile, there’s a whole new generation. So I’m not sure how optimistic I am about it. I applaud it. Keep doing it. But I don’t know that that’s the holy grail.

As for rogue AIs—and that’s, in a way, a form of misalignment if they escape our control and start doing crazy stuff—I think it’s important to realize that natural competitive dynamics, and you could say evolutionary dynamics because this is part of the environment shaping the AIs, encourage the kinds of risks that lead to rogue AIs.

I suspect that corporations will be relying on AIs for more and more of their strategic and tactical decision-making.

And if the rival corporation is using an AI, then you’re going to need to use one if the rival corporation is succeeding. And I agree with the number of people who think it’s going to get to the point where you don’t even really understand the logic behind what the AI is recommending, but you don’t have time to pause and reflect.

So you push the button for competitive reasons, and then surprising things may happen.

Remember, the fundamental property favored in the corporate environment in AI, aside from sheer intelligence, is autonomy: the ability to work for long periods of time without guidance, encountering and surmounting obstacles.

In other words, to move up the org chart in terms of what they can do, because they’re cheaper and faster than humans. And autonomy is kind of a dangerous enterprise if you don’t really understand the machines.

Because you want autonomy, but you want autonomy by a faithful agent. You want autonomy by an agent that can do things without much guidance, but you want it to be aligned with your wishes. And that’s the aim.

Some people say that well-aligned AI will have a competitive advantage because any serious user in business or government will want to ensure that, if it’s going to invest in the technology and rely on it to do all sorts of important things, it can do so with confidence that it is aligned.

I wonder what you think about that.

But I’m also not so sure—and I’m certainly far from an expert on this. I’m not even sure I understand alignment, because human aims are so diffuse and hard to track down. And often they’re corporate aims. I’m not even sure the idea is coherent.

But to the extent that we have this idea of an AI as both autonomous and an agent, it does seem to me that there would be a market for that, right?

Well, if it could be both effectively autonomous and completely reliable, then yeah, that’s the kind you’d get.

But the problem is that there will probably be a tradeoff between the amount of autonomy and the amount of assurance that it won’t misfire.

It’s just like a real human employee. It’s like, yeah, my company would work better if I were a more high-delegation manager. But every time I try, they screw up. Or, if not, steal the money and go to Mexico.

But if there’s a tradeoff—and I think there will be—between how much autonomy you grant the AI agent and how secure you can be that it won’t misbehave and won’t escape control, then in a competitive environment it may be that your rival is favoring autonomy. And in any event, that’s the kind of rival that will get ahead, at least briefly.

In general, I think one thing we don’t appreciate enough about investors—and maybe to some extent startups—is that sometimes a lot of them pursue risky strategies, and one of them lucks out.

That’s the winner. It’s not that they’re geniuses. They’ve just been lucky several times in a row. But eventually that catches up with you.

Although sometimes you can act first and act badly, and it’s a disaster. Acting quickly certainly doesn’t guarantee success.

It doesn’t guarantee it. But there’s the fear that your rival is doing it. We’ll see.

There’s an example in my book where OpenAI releases a model faster than it otherwise would have because of the DeepSeek thing in China.

DeepSeek comes out and everybody’s going, “Oh...” And OpenAI explicitly says they’ll move up a release.

I talked to this highly respected guy, Dan Hendrycks, at the Center for AI Safety, and he showed that OpenAI did not go through the usual procedures.

Now, no catastrophe happened, but that model was less completely vetted than they had said models would be, and than other models had been.

Okay. There are other dangers, but those are enough. I want to move on to solutions, and basically more or less the second half of the book—or the last third of the book. And as I see it, you have a two-pronged proposal.

One is that you make a strong argument that the only way to deal with these problems is through thick global governance, and I want you to talk about that.

And then second, that to achieve thick global governance there needs to be—and I think this is the “God Test,” maybe, and you can explain that—there needs to be broad-scale personal transformation.

Basically, is that fair?

I try to sound a little more moderate.

Yeah, I tend to use “international governance” for the most part, partly because a lot of it, sometimes, is bilateral work. U.S.-China can work for a while, and so on.

And by “global governance,” what I would emphasize is the different connotations of the words governance and government.

The less centralized, the better. The more distributed the decision-making power, the more democratic, the better—and the more secure.

But yes, ultimately I think we’re going to need more global governance than we have.

I don’t think I use the modifier thick per se, but I can see why you thought, in some places, that that was the idea.

Well, you certainly want more than we have now. And so can you talk about what the governance looks like? And I’ll tell you why I’m skeptical.

Sure.

You just talked about a whole bunch of risks. How does global governance—what does it look like, and how does it fix those risks?

Well, in a way, bioweapons are a good concrete example because they’re an extension of a problem that already existed.

One of my great disappointments about the post-COVID dialogue is that evidence emerged that it may well have been a leak—a leak of genetically engineered material from a lab. We don’t know for sure, but obviously it could have been, right?

And it seems to me that the moral of the story should have been: Wait, we need more in the way of international governance here.

Because the U.S. just did not have the transparency that would have been reassuring and would have helped keep this from happening. So something needs to change. But nobody said that.

The response was more like, “China bad.” And that’s kind of the opposite of what you need.

In any event, the general principle is that you would like transparency in order to feel secure in your own nation’s safety. We’re going to see more and more of that.

First of all, AIs can help you make bioweapons. They can create other threats that cross borders. So there are precedents for this, particularly in the realm of arms control. But nukes are easier to regulate than a lot of aspects of AI.

Now, a huge training cluster is not that hard to spot. If you’re talking about, for example, a pause in the training of major new generations of models, that’s probably the easiest verification case you can imagine.

But ultimately, you may need much more fine-grained verification than that. And it’s going to be a huge challenge.

Now, before I talk about how that’s connected to what you call personal transformation, I’ll let you weigh in with your skepticism.

Well, okay. Let me just say a few more things about international governance, then we can go back to the personal component, and then I want to come back to international governance. I just think that the type of governance you’re talking about is extraordinarily difficult.

We’ve got a bioweapons treaty, and it’s a failure. And it’s a failure because it’s dual-use. It involves things down in the private sector or the university sector. It involves coming up with the actual terms of cooperation, which turn out to be very, very difficult. Verification is enormously difficult. And cooperation is enormously difficult because some nations have greater advantages than others.

And that’s the easiest case of all the risks you mentioned. I think that’s among the easiest cases. And it’s significantly harder than the nuclear challenges. But then there are like 50 things like that that would have to be dealt with to address all your safety concerns.

And I’m just looking at the history of international law and international relations. I’m very, very skeptical we’re going to get there. It takes decades, and we don’t have decades to build this kind of cooperation.

One counterpoint you make—and you rely on this a lot in the book—is: Well, we’re just not scared enough yet. Maybe this technology is going to be so fearsome and present such a global existential threat that it will scare us into thicker cooperation.

That’s one counterargument, which I’m not terribly persuaded by either. But what do you think about that?

Well, first of all, the Biological Weapons Convention doesn’t even have an enforcement mechanism on paper. It’s just toothless.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a little more promising on paper because there are actual sanctions for noncompliance. So you’re right. We haven’t come very far in those realms.

I do think a true catastrophe would make a difference. I hope it doesn’t take that. I hope it takes either a very modest catastrophe, or a near miss, or something.

I would say that something new about the nature of this threat is that we’ve already seen, just in the past few weeks, dialogue moving to places I hadn’t thought we’d get to this fast. People are talking about a global pause. And there’s a sense that whatever’s happening is weird, and maybe we’re all in this together.

And also, I would say, humans are engineered by natural selection to be most responsive to threats that are animate—other humans, lions, tigers. And AI is more like that than climate change. It’s more like this living thing that concerns you.

So I think the nature of the psychological impact is going to be new in nature. We’ll see. But I fear, like a lot of people in the AI safety realm, that it may take a kind of catastrophe.

Now, your question has made me wish I had put something a little differently in the book. In the book, I talk about how challenging verification would be because it’s going to need a more fine-grained transparency. And I talk about something I call organic transparency.

I’m trying to get that phrase off the ground. I encourage you to repeat it at dinner-table conversations whenever possible.

The idea is that when you have economic, cultural, and scientific engagement with a country, you just know more about it. The scientists have drinks after the conference. The businesspeople sit down and talk. You know more about what’s going on in the corporate labs than you otherwise would. And that can be reassuring and stabilizing.

What I wish I’d said in the book is that you’re going to need some of the kind of informal reassurance you feel with respect to an ally in, say, a Cold War world.

Like France and China—I mean, we’re increasingly multipolar—but when I was a boy, there were two sides in the Cold War. And of course back then there was no transparency into the Soviet side anyway. But the point is that the way we felt about France and England and so on was very different from the way we feel about China now. And that was partly because the engagement was so fine-grained. But it was also because we felt we were in a collective endeavor.

And it doesn’t seem impossible to me that AI will give the world the feeling that they are in this common endeavor. In any event, that’s part of the psychological shift I’m hoping for.

Nations recognize there’s this weird new thing. It can work out well, maybe. But we really need to get together and work on this. And there will be more of the feeling you have toward China, for example, that you have toward a traditional ally.

But just one small thing. In the Cold War, that was so different because, of course, the Western alliance was going to cooperate because basically the United States was subsidizing the whole thing and providing a massive deterrence umbrella.

And that just made it so much easier. And that feature is not even close to this equation. It’s a much more complicated multi-state—maybe starting with China and the United States—but a much more complicated 190-state bargain.

And maybe you can get the big nations on board and go from there. Anyway, I don’t want to keep repeating my skepticism. And again, you don’t get into all the details in the book.

I’m not saying I’m optimistic. I’m just saying this is what I think needs to happen.

Right. I understand. And the other thing you think needs to happen is—I think I’ve not put it the correct way, because you suggested I haven’t said it quite right—but you do call for, in the book, and I think this is related to the “God Test,” basically overcoming, for lack of a better phrase, tribalism.

You think tribalism is a hurdle to the kind of cooperation that you think is necessary. Is that a fair way of putting it?

Yes—the psychology of tribalism, which I think is more clearly understood now than it was 30 or 40 years ago.

I think there are particular cognitive biases you can point to, in particular an underappreciated one called the attribution error, which I talk about. It’s both underappreciated and misunderstood.

There’s a kind of modern conception of it, and that’s the one I’m talking about.

Unpack what the attribution error is.

The original version of it was that, in explaining other people’s behavior, we attribute too much to their fundamental nature and not enough to their circumstances.

Somebody’s rude in the checkout line in front of you, and you go, “That guy’s a jerk.” And you don’t think, “Well, maybe he just found out his wife has cancer.” We don’t know. Maybe he’s very rarely rude to a clerk and isn’t a rude person as a rule.

That was the way the attribution error was first framed: too much emphasis on disposition, not enough on situation.

Then we learned that it actually depends on the category of person.

For friends, allies, family members, and really ourselves, the tendency is that when they do something good, you attribute it to their nature or disposition. When they do something bad, you explain it away in terms of circumstance. “So yeah, my daughter was mean on the playground, but she hadn’t gotten her nap.” The other kid is mean to my daughter? “That’s a bad kid. Just a bad seed.”

And then, of course, with our enemies and adversaries, it’s the opposite.

They do bad things, and we say, “Well, yeah, that’s because he’s a bad guy.” They do good things, and you say, “Well, that’s just a pose—a temporarily expedient pose.”

This is a real contributor, I think, to conflict among nations. And it’s one reason that people who want a war work so hard to frame the other leader as evil.

I think maybe I was at The New Republic when they put Saddam Hussein on the cover with a Hitler mustache on him. That’s the kind of thing, right? You want them to seem purely evil. And look, Saddam Hussein was a pretty bad guy. But the point is that once you frame somebody as the enemy, they kind of can’t get out of the box, to some extent thanks to attribution error.

Anything good they do, they didn’t really mean. Any offer during negotiations you shouldn’t take seriously, and so on.

So that’s attribution error.

And I think it often impedes cognitive empathy—which is not emotional empathy, but just understanding what’s going on in people’s minds. Just perspective-taking. Not the same as feeling their pain. You may not care about them, but you at least understand their perspective.

I think the absence of that is a leading contributor to human conflict.

We already talked about the common situation where you interpret defensive military postures as offensive. That’s a failure of cognitive empathy. So anyway, when people think about the psychology of tribalism, they may think of fight-or-flight responses, rage, hatred, and so on. Those things aren’t irrelevant.

But I think the big challenge is the subtle cognitive biases that, yes, are influenced by feelings, but feel very rational and cognitive.

And that’s why they’re so insidious.

I agree that tribalism and the psychology underlying it are hurdles—not the only hurdles—to international cooperation. And it’s certainly going to be a hurdle to the kind of international governance that you propose.

Again, as you’ve taught me, these tendencies are deeply ingrained due to evolution. And as you’ve also taught me, they can be overcome in individual cases with a lot of work, but it’s a struggle.

It seems to me, though, that what you’re calling for in this book goes maybe not beyond Nonzero, but beyond some of your earlier work.

And I don’t think you were quite specific on this. Who is going to have this cognitive transformation such that this international cooperation can take place? Are you talking about Xi and Trump? Are they the ones who are going to have this cognitive transformation so they can reach a deal?

And even if they did—which is not likely—and I’m not making fun of the idea, I’m trying to understand it—even if they did, it really seems to me to require far more than individual transformation.

It kind of requires societal transformation, almost, doesn’t it?

I think it does. Because there may always be politicians in whose interest it is to make us fear other groups of people. There are plenty of examples of this. And in that case, what you need is something more like a grassroots movement that is consciously resisting that.

So that might be one piece of the puzzle.

I guess I’m hoping—and again, I’m not predicting—that several different things will happen. People will freak out a little more about AI and start realizing we’re all in this together. You might have a near miss.

I’m hoping that if we moved our foreign policy a little more in the direction I’d like, we would have more broad-based economic and cultural engagement and would not be blockading and sanctioning countries because we think their government should be more like ours. That’s not impossible. There have been times when we were more like that.

And then I’m also thinking that maybe when people start worrying about cognitive sovereignty because they don’t want AI to take over their brains, they may move in a direction that helps address this problem.

You kind of naturally would, because what you’re resisting is your emotional buttons being subtly pushed.

To resist AI—or to resist social media—is to be more aware when you’re responding favorably just because you’re being flattered. In effect, they’re saying, “Your tribe’s good. The other tribe’s bad. You’re smart. Your ideological opponent is stupid.”

And becoming more aware of that is a big part of the battle. Again, part of the incentive to do that may be that you want to have a healthier mind, even in the face of AI that has tremendous persuasive and manipulative power.

There may also be—Well, I should stop and say that AI, in principle, can help here. It’s not inevitable that AI flatters our biases and our self-esteem. You could say, “Wait, I want an AI that will help me see the world more clearly.”

It could go out of its way to say, “Well, there’s evidence that your adversary is actually viewing things this way,” or, “From their point of view, they actually believe they have as strong a grievance as you believe you have.”

Sounds shocking, but they actually do.

So whether or not you agree with them, you have to understand that they’re going to act in accordance with that belief. You can imagine a world in which AI is designed to enlighten us. It has that capability. But we’re going to have to want that.

And I can imagine—although I don’t think I say this in the book—that some religions and other groups start giving certain models their seal of approval. They say, “This represents our values.” That may not always be good. It may be, “Yeah, this AI will tell you our religion is right and the others are wrong, and we should have no tolerance for their wrongness.”

But you can also imagine movements—some of which are largely self-help-oriented, the way people meditate as a form of self-help—that become a little kinder and gentler as a byproduct.

So I’m just telling you where I’m placing some of my hope, not that I’m optimistic.

Okay. I’m going to say—and I’m sorry I’m being so pessimistic—actually, I’m sad to report that reading your book made me much more pessimistic.

Oh man, that is a bad sign. No, but maybe that’s the first step toward enlightenment.

Maybe. Maybe so.

It’s like the five stages of grief, or however many there are.

If it takes—I can imagine, in some discrete areas of severe AI safety, that maybe there can be more robust informal controls. I can imagine that along some dimensions. But most of the safety risks and dangers you talk about, I think, aren’t really subject to governance and control, much less international-level control. It’s just so difficult to coordinate.

And also, I think the kind of overcoming of cognitive biases that you’re talking about—and I think you really do, I don’t know if you hang your hat on it in the book, but it’s certainly a theme you emphasize—that is super difficult.

You’re also calling for this at a time when there are, as you know because you talk about it a lot on your podcast, powerful forces pushing in the opposite direction. This is a time when, because of global and social forces, there is less and less cooperation. The international system is fragmenting. Nationalism is on the rise.

So there are all of those pressures pushing in the other direction.

And when I realized that—if it really does take this kind of personal transformation, I don’t know on what level—then the international governance challenge seems to me even more severe than I thought before I read your book.

Especially because—and I don’t think you talked about this, though I can’t remember—now is the time when we need to be doing things. We don’t have a large window, right, on the pessimistic view. So that was my ultimate takeaway.

I loved the book. I learned a ton from it. But you have the last word. Tell me why I’m either wrong or why you have a more optimistic view.

I’m not going to tell you that I am. Again, it sounds like maybe I do have a slightly more optimistic view.

I’d like to have the last word and then ask you one question. The last word is this: First of all, I’m not by nature an optimistic person. So if I were really optimistic, that would be a great sign, because I’m a tough sell on optimism. And I’m not. But I don’t despair. I think there’s real hope.

And I would just point to some changes that have taken place in the last few months.

A few months ago, there was no systematic dialogue with China on AI. There was no mechanism on paper for the government to vet AIs before their release. And I would say we should keep in mind that this is a two-edged sword.

Of course, whenever the government—and this executive branch is a particularly good example—says, “Hey, we’d like to take a look at that AI for a while before it’s released. We’ll get back to you,” you should ask, “What are they doing with it?”

There have been reports that we are doing offensive cyber operations with Mythos, which I’m not sure I approve of. But anyway, that is a two-edged sword. Still, that is a big shift.

This is, as I’m sure you know, an executive order about something that is, strictly speaking, voluntary. But the big labs will submit the models for review. So that’s changed.

We are now talking to China, at least, about the threat of non-state actors misusing these things. Both of those developments are products, I think, of one development: Mythos.

One model came out, and Anthropic—and nobody had to die, nothing disastrous happened—but Anthropic said, “You know, it has effects.” So that happened.

Meanwhile, Anthropic, for whatever reason—and you can be a little cynical about this—put out a paper subsequently saying maybe it’s time to start thinking about a global pause.

It’s not every day that companies say that about the technology they’re developing.

So things can change. Things have changed fast without any big catastrophe. Things could change faster. And again, I’m hoping for vectors of several kinds interacting constructively.

The question I have for you is: Did I at least convince you that, if we fail, it would be bad news? You may think we’re going to fail, but did you—In other words, you think I am inflating grounds for hope. I deny the allegation, but fine.

Let me pause on that point, because I don’t want to exaggerate. Now that you say that, I don’t want to exaggerate your position as presenting hope. That’s not fair.

What you do is say, this is what we need to do: Global governance and personal transformation.

And I think those things are so darn hard that they make me pessimistic. So maybe you’re not hopeful about it. You don’t take a position. You’re just saying these are the conditions.

And I’m reacting to that by saying it doesn’t seem plausible to me.

It’s a long way from where we are. But I do think it’s in the nature of this technology to change our psychology dramatically on short notice.

But to finish my question to you: leaving aside the question of whether I’m inflating hopes, did you feel I was inflating the threat? In other words — so you didn’t?

I didn’t.

So that’s good news. I mean, if I can just terrify people, that’s half the battle, right?

I’ve been thinking and worrying about AI safety for a long time now. So I knew a decent amount coming into reading the book.

I thought you were masterful at—and sorry to blow smoke—but I thought you were masterful at presenting the threats, explaining why they’re real, and trying to be sober about them while always presenting the counterargument. I thought it was excellent.

But the reader will come away with the impression—and my recollection of the book is—that you spend more time focusing on risks than on upsides.

I think that’s true.

Yeah.

I have a chapter where I list the upsides, but note that it’s a two-sided coin.

Prosperity? Great. Productivity, growth, prosperity.

But job loss could be the flip side. That could be destabilizing.

That’s the general theme. It’s a two-sided coin.

Speaker 2

So I just want to say that the book is massively more interesting than even what we’ve discussed. It’s so thought-provoking on so many levels. The cosmic perspective is a great one, and it’s had me thinking about it ever since I read the book.

There are all sorts of spiritual questions that the book tees up but that you don’t quite talk about, although you walk right up to them.

I think maybe we should close just by having you explain what the “God Test” is.

Yeah. There are a couple of things.

First of all, some people think we’re building a superintelligence that will be a god—that, one way or another, it will be running the planet.

And the question is: What kind of god can we build? Can we have a non-zero-sum, win-win relationship with it? Or can we, although it will have in principle godlike power, keep it from exercising that power? Keep it within bounds, so to speak?

So there’s that: What kind of god will we build?

And I think that points to the second sense of the term “God Test.”

I think if we’re going to succeed in general—not just if there’s this superintelligence and we need to shape it wisely, but if we’re going to avoid various catastrophic risks—we are going to need to have at least a modest moral upgrade as a species.

We need to get better at looking at things from an objective point of view, which natural selection did not design us to always do. And that kind of moral progress is the sort of thing that would be in a test that a god would design.

Historically, people have often believed in gods who said, “Salvation is possible, but you’re going to have to shape up.” And that’s my feeling. Salvation is possible, but we’re going to have to shape up.

Well, I hope we do.

Me too. I really appreciate the kind words, Jack.

Compliments always feel good, but coming from you, they feel better than they feel coming from Claude.

Obviously, I have some disagreements, but the book is outstanding. I learned a ton, and it’s just excellent. And I’m sure it’ll do great.

So thanks for coming on.

Well, thank you.

On Wednesday, the Federal Circuit granted immigration judges’ petition for an initial hearing en banc in Jackler v. DOJ, a challenge to President Trump’s removal of the judges under Article II. (Order.) (Petition for Initial Hearing En Banc.) (Gov. Exec.)

The Presidio Municipal Development District, a political subdivision of Texas, sued the Department of Homeland Security on Wednesday over its effort to construct a section of border wall that will run through a levee system in Big Bend on the ground that the department failed to secure the permission of the Army secretary, as the Presidio alleges 33 U.S.C. § 408 requires. (Complaint.)

U.S. Southern Command announced on Tuesday that it had conducted a lethal strike on an alleged drug trafficking vessel in the Eastern Pacific. (Press Release.) This marks the administration’s 64th known strike on vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. (Just Security.)

The Department of Education announced four new interagency agreements on Tuesday, transferring additional functions out of the department and to the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services. (Press Release.) According to the New York Times, the agreements are part of an ongoing effort to dismantle the Department of Education without authorization from Congress. (NYT.)

The Times reports that despite congressional opposition, it appears Bill Pulte will assume the role of acting director of national intelligence on Friday. (NYT.)

Jack Goldsmith argued that President Trump lacks the domestic legal authority to waive U.S. statutory sanctions against Iran, as he pledged to do in the recent memorandum of understanding, but that Congress and the judiciary are unlikely to stop him. (Executive Functions.)

Michael Dreeben, Jacqueline Sanchez, and Owen O’Brien-Powers argued that Congress has the tools it needs to check the executive branch and reclaim its powers. (Lawfare.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

A memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was digitally signed on Sunday and a formal signing ceremony is set for Friday. A senior U.S. official today disclosed the full text of the MOU.

The United States in the MOU pledges “immediately” to “issue waivers for export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.” (Emphasis added here and throughout.) These waivers presumably include waivers of U.S. statutory sanctions against Iran.

I don’t think the president has the authority under domestic law to issue these waivers. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015 applies here and temporarily bars a president from waiving sanctions against Iran. The executive branch has counterarguments, to be sure. And it’s doubtful that any institution will make the president comply with INARA in any event.

INARA and the MOU

INARA was enacted with broad bipartisan support. It sought to make President Obama submit to Congress a nuclear agreement with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); to force his administration to publicly defend the agreement; and to give Congress a short window to review and possibly reject it, during which period the president was barred from providing Iran with certain sanctions relief.

The act, however, is written in general terms. It requires “the President” within five days of “reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” to submit to Congress the agreement, other documents, and a “certification” concerning the agreement’s consistency with U.S. non-proliferation objectives and related matters. During the period for transmitting the agreement and a (presumptive) 30-day congressional review period, the president “may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to” an agreement relating to Iran’s nuclear program.

INARA requires President Trump to submit the MOU and related documents to Congress, and bars him from waiving statutory Iranian sanctions for at least 30 days, because the MOU “relat[es] to the nuclear program of Iran.”

Here are the material paragraphs:

Paragraph 8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph 7, with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the I.A.E.A. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs, based on the statutory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiation in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

Paragraph 9. Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions, and will not deploy additional forces in the region.

The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is a clear pledge by Iran related to its nuclear program. (President Trump has boasted that the MOU prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and stated that Iran “agreed to never have a Nuclear Weapon!”). So is the second sentence, where the parties “agreed” to resolve “the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material . . . with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the I.A.E.A.” The rest of the paragraph is a pledge to discuss and negotiate about enrichment and other nuclear matters with an eye on a final deal.

In Paragraph 9, the parties “agree” to maintain the status quo, which is that (i) Iran will maintain its nuclear program as is, and (ii) the United States will not impose new sanctions (among other things). Part (i) makes the agreement one related to Iran’s nuclear program since Iran pledges not to change its nuclear program. When added to Iran’s pledge in Paragraph 8 not to build nuclear weapons, the agreement clearly relates to Iran’s nuclear program.

These conclusions are consistent with INARA’s definition of “agreement,” which means “an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action.” The MOU relates to the nuclear program of Iran for reasons just stated. And the United States commits to take many actions in the agreement, including waiving sanctions.

Counterarguments

The executive branch will disagree with this analysis.

It may claim that the thrust of the agreement is to push off any final agreement about Iran’s nuclear program, and thus is not itself an agreement relating to Iran’s nuclear program. Put another way, the MOU is analogous to a “term sheet” about a later agreement on Iran’s nuclear program that does not rise to the level of an agreement relating to the program.

This argument, in addition to its political embarrassment, doesn’t work. The MOU contains present-tense pledges beyond putting off a final resolution of some issues related to Iran’s nuclear program. Most clearly, Iran’s reaffirmation to not “procure or develop nuclear weapons,” and its agreement to “maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program,” are pledges to do something now, not later, related to Iran’s nuclear program. And that means that the MOU, whatever else it may be, is an agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program.

This conclusion is bolstered by INARA’s broad definition of “agreement.” After the quoted definition above, the statute states that it applies to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran—

“regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.”

Even if the MOU were like a term sheet, which it isn’t, it would fall within this definition.

The executive branch’s best argument may be that INARA applies only to the 2015 JCPOA and not to a later agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program. Parts of the statute specifically refer to the “Joint Plan of Action.” But the central obligations apply to “the President” and are triggered by “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran.” The statute defines “agreement” in general terms that sweep in a broad array of agreements. And both the transmittal duty and congressional review provisions are generally phrased and not limited to the JCPOA.

The administration might also claim that INARA’s ban on lifting sanctions is triggered only if the president submits the MOU to Congress, and that if he declines to do so, even in the face of a legal duty, the bar is inapplicable. I think Section 135(b)(3) of the act rules this out. It ties the bar on lifting sanctions not to the president’s actual transmittal of the agreement, but rather to “the period for transmission” of the agreement and “the period for congressional review” specified by the act. The limitation thus applies regardless of whether transmission occurred.

The executive branch may further contend that INARA cannot apply to the MOU since the MOU is a step in an ongoing executive branch negotiation with Iran toward a final and broader agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program. The argument would be that INARA interrupts the negotiation and thus impinges on the president’s exclusive power over diplomacy. (The administration might also invoke the Commander in Chief Clause, since this agreement and ongoing negotiations relate to war; but I will set that aside for now.)

I don’t know any Supreme Court decision or any supportive historical practice that comes close to saying that the president can decline to comply with the statutory terms and conditions of domestic statutes that give him powers he otherwise lacks because he wants to defy those conditions in the service of an international negotiation.

To be sure, the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky affirmed the president’s “unique role in communicating with foreign governments” and relied on Curtiss-Wright’s statement that the president “is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” The Court also cited Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that the “President has the sole power to negotiate treaties.” (As I explain here, Zivotofsky cast doubt on other aspects of Curtiss-Wright.)

The Office of Legal Counsel has relied on these and other precedents to claim a super-broad exclusive power to conduct diplomacy. One can imagine OLC stating that the INARA unconstitutionally impinges on the president’s power to conduct diplomacy and make international agreements, or, more likely, that constitutional avoidance requires reading the MOU not to violate INARA.

The OLC opinions run far beyond what the Supreme Court has actually held, and relies on its own understanding of practice (and executive branch legal interpretations) as much as Supreme Court precedents. Jean Galbraith has powerfully criticized the “Runaway Presidential Power over Diplomacy,” and especially the leveraging of the diplomatic power to disregard substantive policy constraints in enacted statutes, which is implicated here.

Enforcement

The executive branch has a massive advantage in any interpretive dispute over INARA: it can interpret the statute and the Constitution for itself and act on that basis, forcing Congress or other parties or institutions to stop it.

The two institutions that could potentially stop it are Congress and the federal judiciary. I doubt either will do so.

Congress is very unlikely to vote to reject the MOU, which in any event would require veto-proof majorities to succeed. Congress is controlled by the president’s party (though some Republicans are furious with the deal). And majorities in Congress have recently backed resolutions to end the war with Iran (though the Senate yesterday narrowly rejected the latest effort).

A lawsuit is also likely to fail. The main but far from only hard issue is whether anyone has standing to raise the INARA issue. I am skeptical that Congress or some of its members would have standing to sue. The statute does not authorize congressional lawsuits and it contemplates a fast-track procedure for disapproving a covered agreement. These factors cut against congressional or member standing, which is always hard.

There may be private businesses that compete with newly unsanctioned Iranian entities that suffer economic injury. But it is unclear whether any such competitor can show (as standing doctrine requires) that the waivers caused the injury or that an injunction would redress it. A better case for standing could occur in a contract dispute where the applicability of INARA was raised as a defense, but it is unclear to me whether this situation will plausibly arise.

***

It was unthinkable in 2015 that INARA would be deployed against a Republican president who sought in an agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program to waive sanctions against Iran. And before President Trump began his military action against Iran in February, it was unthinkable that he, a famous critic of the JCPOA, would be making such an agreement. But here we are.

President Trump has reportedly said that he “like[s] the idea” of submitting the MOU to Congress for review and approval. Perhaps he thinks that, and perhaps his administration will do so. But the administration is not going to delay implementing the pledges it made in the MOU because of INARA.

Thanks to Matthew Waxman for conversation and comments and Tia Sewell for editorial assistance

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A group of Haitian Temporary Protected Status beneficiaries on Tuesday asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Trump v. Miot as improvidently granted. (Respondents’ Motion.) The filing contends that newly disclosed internal Department of Homeland Security documents suggest that DHS terminated Haiti’s TPS designation without consulting the State Department despite public statements indicating otherwise. (Appendix.) (SCOTUSblog.) (NYT.)

Judge Leonie Brinkema (E.D. Va.) ordered ICE to provide an individualized bond hearing to Mohammad Rahim Wahidi, an Afghan lawful permanent resident detained for more than 14 months while the government seeks to remove him under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s terrorism-related material support provisions. (Order.)

The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island issued its finding and decision with regard to possible misconduct by a Justice Department lawyer who failed to disclose to Judge Melissa DuBose (D.R.I.) that a migrant appearing before her was wanted for homicide in the Dominican Republic. The court found that the lawyer had violated his duty of candor, but recommended no disciplinary sanctions. (Letter.) (Statement of the Court.) (NYT.) See previous Roundups for background.

The New York Times published the full text, as dictated by a senior U.S. official, of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States. (NYT.)

Federal prosecutors in Minnesota unsealed a 94-page indictment charging 15 alleged members of Minneapolis-based antifa groups with conspiracy and other offenses arising from efforts to impede ICE operations. (Indictment.) (NYT.)

The Senate on Tuesday rejected Democrats’ ninth effort to advance a war powers resolution directing President Trump to end U.S. involvement in the war with Iran absent congressional authorization. (NYT.)

George Croner argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Illinois makes it more likely President Trump will turn to the Insurrection Act for domestic deployments and urged courts to closely scrutinize any such invocation. (Lawfare.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026. On June 16, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss the government’s petition as improvidently granted.

The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to hear Genalo v. Black, in which the Second Circuit ruled that noncitizens held in “unreasonably prolonged” detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) are entitled to bond hearings. (Order list.) (SCOTUSBlog.) Politico reports that the grant is “the justices’ most significant move yet to delve into the Trump administration’s sweeping assertion of detention authority and efforts to constrain due process rights for the hundreds of thousands of people ICE is seeking to deport.” (Politico.)

The Department of Justice on Monday moved to intervene in the NAACP’s Clean Air Act lawsuit against xAI in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The DOJ filing, submitted by Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward, argues that the United States is entitled to dismiss citizen-enforcement actions that conflict with federal priorities and that limiting power generation for Grok would undermine national security, energy and artificial intelligence policy objectives. (Memorandum.) (Reuters.)

California Gov. Gavin Newsom said Monday that the Justice Department has opened an investigation into him and his wife. Newsom accused President Trump of directing a politically motivated probe, while a source told the New York Times that multiple investigations are underway and were initiated by federal law enforcement officials in California rather than Washington. (Statement.) (NYT.)

According to the Wall Street Journal, career DOJ staffers investigating Paramount’s proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery were leaning toward recommending a lawsuit to challenge the deal when they were informed Friday that the department’s senior leadership had decided to close the investigation. (WSJ.)

Jack Goldsmith argued that the Iran war “is the latest instance of the ‘one person decides’ principle of U.S. foreign policy that Trump has taken to new extremes, and that undeservedly has received less critical attention than Trump’s domestic unilateralism.” (Executive Functions.)

Andrew McCarthy criticized President Trump’s memorandum of understanding with Iran. (National Review.)

Marty Lederman argued that the D.C. Circuit “went astray” in blocking Judge James Boasberg’s contempt inquiry over the Trump administration’s Alien Enemies Act removals. (Just Security.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Donald Trump started his war with Iran on Feb. 28. He didn’t notify Congress or ask its permission and didn’t consult with it much thereafter. (Nor has Congress appropriated funds specifically for the Iran conflict.) Trump conducted the war as he wished—along the way committing strategic blunders made worse by empty threats and embarrassing claims of victory.

And now Trump purports to have reached a “Great Deal” with Iran that “will bring Peace and Security to the whole Region.” The deal is apparently embodied in a 1.5 page “memorandum of understanding” that is, according to Vice President Vance, a “very general document.” As of this writing the text is not public but based on many reports it does not obviously improve the U.S. position from the baseline of Feb. 28.1 Along the way Trump damaged the American and global economy, as well as America’s military and diplomatic standing.

This process is not what the framers had in mind. The Constitution placed democratic constraints on presidential war and foreign policy decisions to ensure that an incompetent or corrupt president could not easily make very bad international choices on the nation’s behalf.

These constraints have almost entirely disappeared. And that disappearance has enabled Trump, with practically no congressional input, to entirely reinvent U.S. foreign policy and relationships and to reorder global institutions.

There is little that is brand new in the current president’s claims to constitutional and statutory war and foreign relations power. But Trump has used these powers with unprecedented boldness, on an unprecedented scale, with unprecedented disregard for Congress.

The Iran adventure is the latest instance of the “one person decides” principle of U.S. foreign policy that Trump has taken to new extremes, and that undeservedly has received less critical attention than Trump’s domestic unilateralism.

***

The control over war-initiation that the framers thought they gave Congress—mainly in the Declare War Clause and the power over appropriations—has devolved into a dim power to stop presidential war if Congress can overcome a presidential veto. Congress has more leverage if and when a president needs supplemental funding to continue a war—something Trump has not yet sought with Iran.

The check on international agreements embodied in the Senate consent requirement to treaties has been practically eliminated—first by the rise and rise of “executive agreements,” which have some constitutional and statutory constraints, and then by the rise and rise of presidential nonbinding agreements, which have no real constitutional constraints and only very selective and undemanding statutory ones.

In addition to having broad power to make international agreements, presidents also have broad power to abrogate them. And the president’s power over diplomacy has seen “runaway” growth in recent decades.

Congress’s diminished role in war and foreign policy has resulted in part from presidential constitutional arrogation and in part from long-term congressional abandonment and delegation. The trend did not begin with Donald Trump. It began with George Washington and has continued steadily, with blips, for nearly 240 years.

But Trump has taken presidential war and foreign affairs unilateralism to new levels. In this context more than in domestic affairs, where bureaucratic process and pesky courts play a bigger role, Trump can more readily execute his mercurial will. He clearly likes that.

Trump last year bombed Iran’s nuclear sites and then this year began a larger-scale war, the second most consequential unilateral use of force in American history. He invaded Venezuela, deposed its leader, and is now, apparently, indirectly running the country. He has conducted dozens of military attacks on alleged drug runners in the waters off South America. He has also used force in Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and has threatened to use force in Greenland, Mexico, Oman, Cuba, Panama, and, arguably, Colombia.

Majorities in Congress voted against the Iran adventure but failed to stop it and Congress has done nothing of substance on the other war matters.

Trump has taken a wrecking ball to international agreements and institutions without any involvement by Congress. He killed many agreements in his first term—most notably, the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran (an agreement made without congressional consent). In his second term, Trump has withdrawn from the foundational U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, among other international agreements, and from scores of international organizations.

Most of these latter withdrawals were part of a larger effort to delegitimize a fundamental international treaty organization—the United Nations. In addition to broad withdrawal from U.N. treaties and bodies, and to many violations of the U.N. Charter, Trump has sought to starve the U.N. (including its organizations and peacekeepers) of funds, and to gut foreign aid more broadly, not to mention USAID—though in some of these contexts Congress pushed back a bit. And he established the Board of Peace as a workaround or alternative to the United Nations.

Trump has long threatened to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty. This is a rare area where Congress has constrained a president from pursuing a foreign policy goal. I believe the constraint is lawful, though not everyone does. But it’s far from clear anyone can sue in federal court to enforce it.

And short of formally leaving NATO, Trump has taken steps to diminish the alliance—for example, withdrawing troops from Germany, threatening reductions elsewhere, delaying deployment to Poland, and casting doubt on whether the United States would defend NATO countries if attacked. He has also altered U.S. policy towards Ukraine. These moves and threats are within the president’s discretion.

And then there is Taiwan. The long-term U.S. policy—wrapped in formal strategic ambiguity—has been to preserve democratic Taiwan’s de facto autonomy through deterrence and the U.S. capacity to intervene. This policy is reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act and decades of presidential diplomacy.

Many worry that Trump will bargain away Taiwan for some larger deal with the People’s Republic of China. Trump could do this if he chose. The Taiwan Relations Act imposes an unenforceable duty on the president “to inform the Congress promptly” of any threat to Taiwan or U.S. interests arising from threats to Taiwan. It adds that the president and Congress shall together determine “appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” But the president controls U.S. diplomacy, and it is ultimately his decision whether to defend Taiwan militarily.

Finally, President Trump, like all contemporary presidents, has aggressively used his many statutory emergency and sanctions powers.

***

Most of Trump’s actions are lawful under domestic law. Some may not be, though they build on presidential precedents of various sorts. Presidents often get away with even illegal actions in these contexts because Congress is feckless and courts—due to standing and the political question doctrine—often do not get involved.

There are, of course, counterexamples, especially when the president reads a statutory authority aggressively and someone has standing to sue. Trump’s big tariff loss a few months ago in Learning Resources is a good example.

But Trump was still able to have a huge global impact before the Court ruled, and he has continued many tariffs under other statutory authorities. And in any event, Learning Resources is an exception to the longstanding general rule that, as Harold Koh taught almost four decades ago, the president almost always wins in foreign affairs.

While Trump is exercising powers that presidents have in the round long exercised, in his hands the powers seem, and perhaps are, quite different. This is because Trump has exercised many of these powers on a much grander scale than his predecessors, often to depart sharply from what was previously a bipartisan foreign policy consensus. Trump has also displayed unusual disregard toward Congress—and Congress has done practically nothing about it. This pattern reflects the “separation of parties, not powers” enhanced by Trump’s unique retributive politics.

***

The democratic checks contemplated by the Constitution seek to ensure that U.S. foreign policy is generally stable, and that a president’s major foreign policy decisions conform to the national interest, or at least can withstand the scrutiny of democratic debate.

This system clearly no longer works. Congress has too little say in the conduct of foreign policy. It rarely legislates to shape that policy, as it once often did. It rarely uses its vital political weapons when a president engages in unwise foreign policy. Like them or not, there are no Senators Mansfield, Nunn, or McCain to provide firm and sometimes wise counterpoints to presidential foreign policy.

Extreme presidential unilateralism in war and foreign relations tends to produce bad consequences. One is that it is too easy for presidents to start wars.

Another is that U.S. foreign policy lacks coherence across short periods. When important foreign policies are the decisions of a president alone unmoored from presidency-transcending laws and agreements, or specific congressional consent, they tend to seesaw across presidencies.

Consider Iran’s nuclear weapons. President Obama sought to control them through sanctions and then diplomacy and a non-binding agreement. That agreement, the JCPOA, took 20 months of intensive negotiations. It lasted about two and a half years, at which time (in May 2018) Trump tore it up. President Biden tried but failed to put it back together. And now Trump in his second term chose to deploy fierce military force to curb Iran’s nuclear program.

Or consider the Paris Climate Agreement. Obama, again skirting a congressional vote, signed it on Aug. 29, 2016. Trump announced U.S. withdrawal in 2017, which went into effect in November 2020. Biden upon entering office in 2021 signed an executive order to rejoin the agreement. Trump on his first day in office in 2025 again announced the U.S. withdrawal, which went into effect in January 2026.

This basic back-and-forth pattern has also been repeated with respect to a number of international organizations (e.g. the World Health Organization and the U.N. Human Rights Council). There is every reason to expect it will continue if a Democrat wins the presidency in 2028.

U.S. foreign policy has never to my knowledge been unstable in these ways. The obvious consequence of this instability, beyond whatever bad policies result, is that U.S. foreign policies and commitments—formal and informal, legalized or not—are increasingly and foreseeably unreliable. That cannot be good news for fruitful U.S. relations with the rest of the world.

Thanks to Molly McCammon and Tia Sewell for editorial assistance

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A panel of the D.C. Circuit on Friday denied the Trump administration’s motion for an immediate administrative stay of a lower court’s May 29 ruling requiring Kennedy Center officials to remove all references to the institution as the “Trump Kennedy Center,” including removing signage that purports to rename the center. (Order.) Justice Department lawyers filed a notice of compliance with the permanent injunction order on Saturday. (Notice.) (CBS.)

Judge Leonie M. Brinkema (E.D. Va.) on Friday ordered senior administration officials, including Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, to file by June 19 “a declaration under the penalty of perjury that they will not take any action to create or operate the Anti-Weaponization Fund, and that the [fund] will not proceed in any manner, under any name.” Judge Brinkena entered a preliminary injunction barring the administration from taking any action related to the creation or operation of the $1.8 billion fund. (Order.) (NYT.)

Attorneys for President Trump on Friday filed an opposition to the motion of 35 former federal judges to reopen the president’s case against the Internal Revenue Service in the Southern District of Florida. The filing contends that the court lacks authority to review the parties’ settlement, that the movants lack standing, and that the movants “fail to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard required to establish fraud on the court.” (Motion.) (Politico.) For background, see previous Roundups.

Anthropic suspended all customer access to its newest AI models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5, after receiving notice from the Commerce Department that the models had been placed under export controls requiring licenses for access by foreign nationals. (Anthropic Statement.) (WSJ.) Alan Rozenshtein discussed the government’s move and argued that “there is at least a facially plausible legal framework in this case.” (Lawfare.)

The New York Times published a confidential White House memo shedding light on internal discussions about the president suspending habeas corpus for undocumented immigrants in 2025 as a way to accelerate deportations and limit judicial review. The report also details internal debates over invoking the Insurrection Act in response to immigration-related protests, with White House Staff Secretary Will Scharf warning that both proposals could trigger significant legal and constitutional challenges. (NYT.)

Politico reports that, despite a Fifth Circuit opinion endorsing ICE’s expanded mandatory detention policy, district judges in Texas and Louisiana have ordered bond hearings or release for detainees more than 1,200 times on due process grounds since the appellate ruling. (Politico.)

President Trump spoke with the New York Times about the cease-fire agreement he reached with Iran on Sunday. (NYT.)

President Trump announced Friday that U.S. Southern Command “delivered a swift and lethal kinetic strike to successfully execute Niño Guerrero, the infamous leader of Tren De Aragua” in coordination with “our friends in Venezuela.” (Truth Social.) (Politico.)

President Trump announced on Saturday that he would appoint a former personal lawyer, James McDonald, to serve as the next U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Truth Social.) (WSJ.)

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which enables the government to collect foreign intelligence without a warrant, expired at 12 a.m. on Saturday after Congress failed to pass an extension. (NBC.)

Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith discussed the stakes of President Trump’s nomination of Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general. (Executive Functions.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Mentioned:

• “The High Stakes of the Blanche Nomination” by Bob Bauer (Executive Functions, June 9, 2026)

Thumbnail: President Trump participates in an Oval Office press conference with then-Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, October 15, 2025. (Official White House Photo.)

This is an edited transcript of an episode of “Executive Functions Chat.” You can listen to the full conversation by following or subscribing to the show on Substack, Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Jack Goldsmith: Good morning, Bob.

Bob Bauer: Good morning, Jack.

Today we’re going to talk about President Trump’s nomination of Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, his defense lawyer in three of his criminal cases, to be the attorney general.

Blanche was an assistant U.S. attorney for eight years in the Southern District of New York. He was confirmed last year to be the deputy attorney general, which he has been for almost 18 months. That background would normally qualify him for the job as a formal matter, but does that mean he’s qualified for the job?

No. No, and I think there’s been a very strong reaction, certainly doubts also expressed on the Republican side, and it’s based on both his performance as deputy attorney general and then subsequently his performance as acting attorney general, which has appeared to be a wholesale commitment—whatever doubts he may be expressing privately, a wholesale commitment—to doing what Donald Trump wants done, with a particular emphasis on pursuing this very flagrant program of weaponization.

And it has turned out, if one is to credit press reports, that while there was some thought that, with his experience, he would bring a certain sobriety into the Department of Justice and resist the expanded weaponization, aggressive weaponization, within the department, it then developed that he wasn’t going to do that and that he was going to proceed.

Topped off—although that’s not the only point that we can discuss—by his attempting to put into place, and since apparently on his part abandoned (it’s not clear what the president thinks), this massive Anti-Weaponization Fund that would be used to compensate allies of the president who claim that they were targeted by Democrats in the prior administration.

So the Anti-Weaponization Fund matter seems, in the press reports I’ve read, to be the thing that concerns the senators the most, and I worry a little bit that that’s going to become too much the focus of this because that’s easily expendable, and in fact it might be on the way to being expended.

Can you just summarize some of the other types of weaponization, inappropriate weaponization, that you think Blanche has supervised or approved or been involved in?

Yes. So let’s begin with one case that was dismissed, which was the prosecution of Letitia James, the state attorney general in New York, who was targeted by Bill Pulte. And we’ll come back to Bill Pulte, whose appointment to be—or designation to be—Acting Director of National Intelligence is still pending.

And apparently internally, Blanche expressed some doubts, again according to press reports, about the case against James, but it was brought anyway, and then it was dismissed.

Again, in the case of James Comey, the president has tried repeatedly to direct the Department to successfully prosecute Jim Comey. One such case was dismissed. Most recently—and this is directly on Blanche as acting attorney general—Comey was indicted for arranging seashells on the seashore in the form of 86-47, which was interpreted, against all reasonable assessments of what that term means and how it’s typically used, as a call to commit violence against Donald Trump.

Nobody that I have seen, whether it’s Andrew McCarthy in the National Review or any other commentary across the range—across the whole range of commentary—takes this case seriously, but it was brought, consistent with the president’s just absolute Ahab commitment to getting Jim Comey.

And there are apparently weaponization prosecutions in the making that Blanche is overseeing against former CIA Director John Brennan and former witness against him in the January 6th matter, Cassidy Hutchinson.

So it’s a pretty dismal record of weaponization and support for weaponization. And that, it seems to me—and I agree with you—is a much broader story than merely the establishment of the Anti-Weaponization Fund.

What about—you wrote earlier this week about Blanche’s failure to recuse himself from cases and perhaps an ethical violation. Can you explain that?

Yes. So he came to the office, obviously it’s the president’s choice, as were other senior-level appointments to the Department of Justice, because he had served the president as personal counsel in recent years in these high-profile investigations: Jan. 6th, the Mar-a-Lago documents case, the Bragg prosecution in Manhattan.

And the question was, given his involvement with the president, the deep professional commitment that he’s had over these years, in what circumstances would he recuse himself from matters that involve Donald Trump? Whether we’re talking about deeply personal and significant politically explosive matters like Epstein, all the way to matters that touch upon weaponization, like Jan. 6th.

And he was evasive about the commitment that he would make. He was confirmed, nonetheless.

There is virtually no evidence that he has pursued a serious recusal policy consistent with the recusal standards both traditionally followed by the department and, in one way or another, captured in its ethics rules and handbook.

And I think it’s fairly clear that on anything that the president really, really cares about, the department will clear the way for Blanche to act. I should add that clearance has been made all the easier because the ethical enforcement infrastructure of the department has been taken down.

The president fired the Senate-confirmed director of the Office of Government Ethics. The Department of Justice dismissed the most senior DOJ official responsible for ethics compliance, by the way, just a few months after he had counseled Blanche, according to reports, and other members of the president’s former legal team who are now at the Department of Justice, that they would have to recuse themselves in matters involving Donald Trump.

So there really are no firewalls, no indication that he’s asking for ethics advice, or that the ethics advice being given to him is independent rather than simply configured to allow him to do what the president wishes.

Let me just clarify one thing. I don’t know if you just said this, but during his confirmation hearings to be deputy attorney general, was this an issue, the question of whether he would comply with the recusal norms of the Justice Department?

Yes.

Did he make representations about that?

Yes, I should be clear. He said he would—he was asked about that. It was obviously a major issue, given his service as lead counsel in these key representations of the president in prior years.

And he basically said, you know, he would consult with ethics officials, he would consult. So he left himself open the discretion of whether to consult or not.

And then he would take action essentially at his discretion, you know, consistent with, as he put it, ethical standards.

But he refused to be pinned down to any kind of categorical recusal in matters that involved Donald Trump personally, precisely the kind of matters on which he’d represented him in the past.

Okay.

So there are many interesting things about the nomination. One is, in a way, it’s unnecessary.

Blanche could serve as the effective attorney general for the rest of Donald Trump’s second term. Right now, because the attorney general stepped down, there’s a DOJ succession statute that says—and I’m going to read it here; this is 28 U.S. Code § 508—the deputy attorney general may exercise all the duties of the office of the attorney general.

And a plausible, if not the best, reading of that is that it is without term—that he can basically, as deputy, exercise all the powers of the attorney general independent of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act time limitations.

But even under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, if he became acting attorney general, the time limits could be manipulated in a way where he could continue to serve out, basically exercising the functions of the attorney general.

So in some sense, this is an unnecessary nomination if Trump wanted Blanche running the department, which means Trump, I think it’s fair to say, wanted this fight, or at least wanted to reward Blanche’s loyalty.

But I imagine that there are a lot of senators who don’t want to have to take this vote. What does it mean that Trump wanted to trigger a confirmation fight?

It seems that he wants to, in effect, challenge the Senate to either endorse or reject his choice of somebody who will be faithful to that weaponization program and do as the president directs in full control of the Department of Justice.

He wants to take that model and have it validated by the Senate.

He didn’t have to do this, as you pointed out. He could accomplish all his objectives without doing it, but he’s doing it.

And all of this at the same time, by the way, as he’s pursued—maybe with, it looks like perhaps not with success, but we’ll see—this avenue of weaponization through the designation of Bill Pulte to be acting director of national intelligence.

So we’re talking about a particular model, a particular structure for the Department of Justice that he has been very open and aggressive about, promoted on Truth Social, with no question whatsoever how he views what the Department of Justice owes him and what kind of policies or approaches, like weaponization, it pursues.

And he wants the Senate to confirm not just Blanche, but that particular model for the Department of Justice.

Right. So it seems to me that is what’s at stake here. This is the big issue.

When Attorney General Bondi and Blanche were confirmed last year, there were hints that there might be counter-weaponization or weaponization and the like. I don’t think anyone fully understood the extent of it, or certainly it has been relentless and very imaginative and aggressive since then.

So the Senate confirmed him last year, but now, a year and a bit later, there’s an extensive record of the way that Donald Trump has wanted to run the Justice Department, and it’s been done.

And so now, if the Senate confirms Blanche, it’s not just confirming someone as attorney general; it’s endorsing Trump weaponization.

That’s what’s at stake in the Senate confirmation: whether the Senate will exercise what I believe are its responsibilities to ensure that law enforcement isn’t abused. This is one very important check on that.

Now, to be clear, Blanche is going to be acting as attorney general one way or the other, but the question is whether the Senate will endorse what’s been going on.

Yes. And maybe there are signs that this particular hope on the president’s part will be frustrated.

The U.S. Senate is currently in conflict over the Pulte nomination, and it has resulted in a stalemate over authorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

And it now appears that, with the nomination of what I think is to be the formally nominated and confirmed head of national intelligence, there’s an effort underway to try to address objections to Pulte and to keep Pulte out of ODNI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

In fact, Clayton’s hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday of next week. And the Democrats apparently are making it clear that they expect him to be confirmed before the 19th, when the president has indicated that he expects Pulte to assume the acting director’s responsibilities at that office.

And so the question is: Will similar types of Senate pressure be applied here to the Blanche nomination?

So just a couple of points on that that I’ve read in the last few days. Senator Grassley, who’s the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said a year ago Blanche was approved, and I don’t think anything’s changed.

So Senator Grassley, anyway, seems prepared to—if he thinks nothing material has changed—he seems to think that the weaponization is not relevant, and he’s prepared to vote to confirm Blanche. That’s what it sounds like to me.

But there are also, I count, at least three senators—sitting senators—whose careers Trump has effectively ended in the last year: Senator Tom Tillis, Senator John Cornyn, and Senator Bill Cassidy.

It’ll be interesting to see if they vote to confirm. I think it’s going to take four Republican defections, given the vice president’s vote. It’ll take four Republican defections, at least, to kill the nomination.

Also, I think Senator Tillis, on the Judiciary Committee, could vote to keep it from getting out of committee, which would either kill it or make it very difficult.

And then there’s Senator Collins of Maine. I don’t know how she’s going to vote on this, but I expect she’s not looking forward to voting either way on it. Senator Murkowski. Senator Young from Indiana has been very opposed to the weaponization slush fund and has been kind of a rule-of-law person on these issues. I don’t know how he’ll vote.

So any prognosis about how this will play out?

No. The Grassley comment was remarkable, by the way.

But I would add Mitch McConnell to your list. He was extremely critical of the establishment of the fund.

And I think the question is going to be: Are the Republicans going to be successful with messaging that this is all about the weaponization fund? And if all doubts about that are resolved and it’s taken down, then they’re prepared to have a hearing in which Blanche makes the usual anodyne commitments, one way or the other, about impartiality and keeping politics out of law enforcement; they pronounce themselves satisfied with the answers, and they confirm him.

Or will that larger picture that you’ve drawn about what’s really at stake here be the one they consider?

I just want to add this one last comment on this. Congress has to consider—and I think it does, by the way, I should say—what weaponization in the hands of a president, so brazenly and aggressively pursued, means for the separation of powers in our scheme of government.

This president has made it clear already in the exercise of the pardon power, if you will, on the other end, that he’s prepared to exercise it to benefit Republicans.

Weaponization likewise, just as he’s deployed it to attack other enemies, could be deployed against people who are thwarting his plans in Congress on either side of the aisle—maybe predominantly Democrats, but potentially also Republicans.

There are huge institutional stakes in taking a stand against this kind of weaponization of the Department of Justice.

I couldn’t agree more.

I mean, I do fear it’s going to be too much focused on the weaponization fund and not the broader weaponization.

In my view, really, the independence and integrity of the Senate is at stake here. And basically, the Senate will be assuming responsibility for, and endorsing, Trump-style weaponization if it confirms Blanche.

And I think that’s exactly what the president wants. And that’s exactly, in my view, why he nominated him.

Yes, absolutely. And endorsing, basically, the general principle.

And then even on the more specific or narrow question of recusals, endorsing a program of having essentially the entire system for monitoring conflicts of interest, at the most extreme end, completely taken down.

Okay. Thanks very much. We’ll see what happens.

Thank you.

Judge Kyle Dudek (M.D. Fla.) ordered the release of a detained noncitizen after an immigration judge refused to comply with the district court’s prior order requiring a bond hearing, the government’s counsel “acquiesced in that refusal,” and the government, facing a renewed habeas petition, sought reversal of the court’s prior order. Judge Dudek said the sequence of events “border[ed] on the surreal.” (Order.)

Judge John McConnell, Jr. (D.R.I.) entered partial final judgment vacating and setting aside four U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services policies that indefinitely paused the adjudication of certain immigration benefit requests. He ordered the government to file a status report within 24 hours detailing the steps it has taken to comply with the court’s June 5 order vacating those policies. (Order.) For background, see a previous Roundup.

President Trump said on Thursday that he would nominate Jay Clayton, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, to be the next director of national intelligence. (Truth Social.) (NYT.)

The House of Representatives rejected a bill on Thursday that would have temporarily renewed Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The provision expires at midnight tonight. (NYT.) Nineteen Republicans joined Democrats in opposing the measure. (Clerk of the House.)

Four former and retired judge advocates general—Calvin Lederer, John Ewers, Eugene R. Fidell, and Steven J. Lepper—offered a set of principles to guide judge advocates both in their daily practice and “particularly in deployed operations during these challenging times.” (Just Security.)

David Post proposed a set of questions to ask Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche at his upcoming confirmation hearing. (Volokh.)

Quinta Jurecic explained that two defense tactics that typically face long odds in court—motions to dismiss criminal charges for vindictive or selective prosecution and motions to obtain access to the transcripts of grand-jury proceedings—have increasingly succeeded as courts have grown wary of relying on the Justice Department’s representations. (Atlantic.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) declined on Wednesday to issue a temporary restraining order blocking the establishment of the administration’s Anti-Weaponization Fund on the ground that the matter “appears to be moot” in light of the administration’s stated plans not to move forward with the fund. (Politico.)

The County of Santa Clara and State of California sued the Department of Homeland Security in the Northern District of California on Wednesday, arguing that the department’s effort to construct and operate an immigration-holding facility in Santa Clara County violates the National Environmental Policy Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, and Administrative Procedure Act. (Complaint.)

The Trump administration is reportedly preparing to deport migrants from Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria to the Central African Republic on Thursday, in what would be the first set of removals to the country. (NYT.) Anjli Parrin and Savi Arvey argued that the move would put migrants’ lives at risk. (Just Security.)

The New York Times reported that Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg previously worked closely with David Rush—the former CIA officer who was arrested after the FBI discovered $40 million in gold bars in his home—on a highly classified effort to spy on China. (NYT.)

William “Chip” Usher argued that U.S. intelligence support for the Israeli strike that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei upended the executive branch’s longstanding approach to the targeted killing of foreign leaders. (Lawfare.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Two legal teams challenging the administration’s Anti-Weaponization Fund on Tuesday filed court papers expressing skepticism that the Department of Justice would follow through with its stated plan to abandon the $1.8 billion fund. (Reply.) (Expedited Motion.) (NYT.)

Politico reports that Patrick Davis, assistant attorney general for legislative affairs, sought to recuse himself from matters involving the administration’s proposed Anti-Weaponization Fund because he planned to seek compensation for the government’s seizure of his communications records while investigating the Russia probe as a Senate staffer. A DOJ spokesperson said that the recusal effort was “precautionary” and “after internal consultation, it was decided that recusal was not necessary for a number of reasons.” (Politico.)

The Wall Street Journal reports that White House officials have directed a government artificial-intelligence testing unit to halt publication of its public AI-model assessments while a new executive order on AI innovation and security is implemented. (WSJ.)

The New York Times reports that despite having “occasionally assumed an adult-in-the-room role” at the Justice Department, acting Attorney General Todd Blanche “has more often been a speed bump, rather than a stop sign,” in executing the president’s demands. (NYT.)

Bob Bauer argued that Blanche’s nomination as attorney general raises broader concerns about the erosion of Justice Department ethics rules and conflict-of-interest safeguards in Trump 2.0. (Executive Functions.)

Ed Whelan discussed a federal judge’s “puzzling” ruling against President Trump’s $100,000 H-1B visa fee. (National Review.) For background on the opinion, see yesterday’s Roundup.

Andrew McCarthy wrote that the DOJ has not deported Kilmar Abrego Garcia to Costa Rica because it is using that outcome “as leverage to pressure him to plead guilty to the criminal charges—with the threat that it would send him to an African country, to which he objects, if he continues contesting the charges.” (National Review.)

Chris Geidner reported on a pair of hearings in challenges to the Justice Department’s efforts to obtain records related to gender-affirming care for minors. (Lawdork.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

When asked about President Trump’s nomination of acting Attorney General Todd Blanche to become a confirmed AG, Republican Senate Majority Leader John Thune would not predict confirmation in “an environment where nothing is a safe or sure bet.” He did, however, note that “most of our members are pretty deferential to who the president wants in these key positions,” and then added, “He’s already serving in the role . . . and clearly has experience in it.” This response suggests that standard deference will apply in the Blanche nomination, complicated only by conflict between the president and Congress.

This is the wrong approach for the Senate to take.

Donald Trump has established a distinctive model for the operation of the Department of Justice and the role of the AG, one that he now seeks to validate by putting Blanche forward for confirmation. The implications for both this and future administrations cannot be understood solely by examining Blanche’s specific decisions as acting leader. The issue facing Congress is more profoundly institutional in character: It is about the gutting of ethical rules and procedures in place to protect against conflicts of interest in the management of the Justice Department.

Trump is not the first president to select individuals with personal or political ties to the president to lead the Justice Department and run the department with less, rather than more, distance from the White House. But he has taken this model further, more aggressively and openly, than any of his predecessors. His first step was to signify and ensure full presidential control by staffing the department at senior levels with lawyers from his personal legal defense team. The Senate confirmed all these nominees.

What remained to secure a modicum of independence were recusal rules. Blanche and Trump’s other picks to run the department would presumably remove themselves from participation in or oversight of cases or matters that, in light of their prior personal service to the president, would enmesh them in clear conflicts of interest. In Blanche’s case, this history of personal representations is extensive and includes the federal Jan. 6 prosecution, the Mar-a-Lago classified documents case, and the Manhattan District Attorney’s business records prosecution.

Blanche’s tenure as deputy and now acting AG has shown how the rules and the process for enforcing the recusal rules were neutered.

First, in his confirmation hearing as deputy AG, Blanche evasively addressed questions about the conflict of issues questions raised by his personal representations of the president. He stated repeatedly that “in the event of any potential conflict of interest, I will consult with the appropriate Department of Justice ethics officials and act consistent with governing regulations.” Blanche did not commit to abiding by the counsel of “appropriate Department of Justice ethics officials,” only to “consult with them.” He did not pledge to comply with existing ethics rules, only to “act consistent with” them—whatever he might have meant. When pressed repeatedly on how he would exercise any discretion he possessed to recuse himself from involvement in matters related to this representation of the president, he would not pledge to exercise this discretion more in favor of recusal than not.

Congress let this all go by and confirmed him as deputy AG. Blanche promptly supported, and now runs, the president’s program of retribution and weaponization, which is rooted in Trump’s rage over the prosecutions in which Blanche was his lead defense counsel. He also handled the controversial settlement by which Trump has sought to obtain immunity from any federal tax-related claims (through at least May 19 of this year).

The Justice Department claims that Blanche recused himself “from many cases” but will not disclose which ones. There have been reports that he recused himself from a potential criminal investigation of E. Jean Carroll, who successfully sued Trump for both sexual assault and libel. Blanche was a member of the team that appealed the verdicts. But the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois has denied on the record that his office is planning for or conducting this investigation.

The more clearly established disregard of conflicts relating to Trump’s personal life is Blanche’s direct, personal involvement in the Epstein case. For two days, he interviewed a key witness, Epstein’s close associate Ghislaine Maxwell, who was convicted and is now in prison for sex trafficking. Following the interview, Maxwell was moved from a low-security prison in Florida to a minimum-security facility in Texas.

Second, with the president’s help, Blanche rid himself of the burdens of unwanted advice from DOJ ethics officials. Not long after he was confirmed, the head of DOJ ethics compliance reportedly advised him that he and the other of Trump’s personal attorneys in charge of the department had to recuse themselves from matters related to their personal representations of Trump. Shortly thereafter, this official was dismissed. The president also fired the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. After a series of Vacancy Act designations, the position is now unfilled, and Trump has not nominated a new director.

The Trump administration has effectively disabled the entire executive branch ethics advisory and enforcement process.

We do not know whether Blanche, as he pledged in his confirmation hearing, “consults” with officials who have any responsibility for ethical guidance. We do not know the degree to which any advice given is independent—or geared to providing ample running room for Blanche to do as the president desires. What is known from the public record of the last year and a half provides no basis for reassurance.

Why, if Trump has picked loyalists for the roles, do the recusal rules matter? They matter because they function as a fundamental limit on the extent to which those with responsibility over criminal law enforcement depart from, in Justice Robert Jackson’s famous words, “the spirit of fair play and decency” expected of federal prosecutors. Recusals reflect an understanding that while those with great power may act unwisely or wrongly, there are circumstances in which they should not act in the case at all, because they have specific interests or commitments that render them incapable, in fact or in appearance, of impartiality. Prosecutors may be motivated to perform unethically for other reasons—among them, the pressures exerted by ambition, politics, or ideology. Conflicts of interest do not require inquiry into motive but presume that the official cannot escape the danger of decision-making bias or the suspicion of it.

Recusals matter especially where department appointees are chosen on the basis of prior personal or political ties and service to the president. They serve as a last line of defense against the complete abandonment of a commitment to impartiality in both fact and appearance. These rules arise out of a core ethical requirement, which the department professes to follow, that “Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual” and “shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance” of the violation of these and other ethical standards.

Todd Blanche’s service in the Department of Justice in Trump 2.0 cannot be squared with these standards.

The source of these conflicts is not just a question of choices that Blanche has made. It is a frontal challenge to long-standing ethical standards and the procedures by which they are applied and enforced. These are the larger issues raised by the Blanche nomination.

The Senate is responsible for the sorry ethical state of affairs at DOJ, having looked the other way when confirming Blanche the first time. The question now is whether senators will take up the challenge Trump has thrown down.

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Judge Leo T. Sorokin (D. Mass.) on Monday granted summary judgment to a coalition of 20 states challenging President Trump’s proclamation imposing a $100,000 payment requirement on new H-1B visa petitions. Judge Sorokin held that the payment functioned as an unauthorized tax that exceeded the president’s delegated authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Memorandum and Order.) (NYT.)

President Trump on Monday nominated Todd Blanche, his former personal lawyer and current acting attorney general, to serve as attorney general. (Presidential Action.) (NYT.)

The Justice Department announced on Monday that it has “filed denaturalization actions in various U.S. district courts against 17 individuals accused of serious offenses—including sexual abuse of a minor, wire and bank fraud, and distributing drugs wholesale without a license.” (Press Release.) (NYT.) For background on the Justice Department’s push to denaturalize more immigrants, see the Roundup Library.

The New York Times reports that FBI Director Kash Patel’s push to investigate a purported anti-Trump “deep state” conspiracy has “set off cascading crises with U.S. attorneys’ offices, derailed distinguished careers and undercut the Justice Department’s credibility with judges.” (NYT.)

Scott R. Anderson argued that congressional resolutions opposing the war in Iran may have legal significance even if they lack the force of law. (Lawfare.)

David Post argued that acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has not conferred “immunity” or an “audit shield” on President Trump because he is not authorized to do so. (Volokh Conspiracy.)

J. Benton Heath argued that President Trump’s AI executive order reflects the administration’s broader reliance on executive discretion and industry self-regulation. (Just Security.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Judge John J. McConnell (D.R.I.) on Friday vacated and set aside a set of policies enacted by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services that paused adjudication of certain immigration benefits for individuals from designated “Travel Ban Countries.” (Memorandum and Order.) (NYT.)

Judge Myong J. Joun (D. Mass.) on Friday granted a preliminary injunction barring the Department of Agriculture from conditioning federal funding to states on compliance with various Trump administration policy priorities. (Electronic Order.) (Reuters.)

President Trump on Friday stated that he wants Bill Pulte, his pick for acting director of national intelligence, to “start the process” of firing employees in the U.S. intelligence community. “I’d like to see it smaller,” Trump said of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “I think there are a lot of people in there that shouldn’t be here.” (WSJ.)

The Justice Department on Friday asserted in two twin federal court filings that the $1.8 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund “had not been set up and is now not going forward,” adding that claims challenging the fund’s creation are therefore not justiciable. (D.D.C. Response.) (E.D. Va. Response.) (NYT.) In a pre-recorded interview that aired Sunday, President Trump maintained that “the weaponization fund is a great idea” and said that he would be “disappointed” if it is not approved. (Politico.) Anna Bower and Eric Columbus argued that even if the administration scraps the fund, the president could still pay his political allies with taxpayer money—and in fact has done so for the past year. (Lawfare.)

President Trump on Thursday granted a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon” to Stephen Buyer, a former Indiana Republican congressman who was convicted of insider trading in 2023. The Washington Post notes that the act marks Trump’s 13th pardon to a current or former member of Congress across his two terms. (Presidential Action.) (WaPo.)

A Justice Department attorney told a D.C. Circuit panel on Friday that courts lack authority to halt construction of the White House ballroom project, even if it were ultimately found unlawful. According to Politico, the panel appeared skeptical of that argument. (Politico.)

Mark Nevitt argued that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth may have exceeded his legal authority by removing officers from Navy promotion lists. (Just Security.)

Andrew McCarthy argued that Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche’s agreement purporting to shield President Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization from future IRS audits is likely unenforceable. (National Review.)

Pending Interim Order Applications Involving the U.S. Government in the Supreme Court

Blanche v. Perlmutter: The government filed an emergency application on October 27 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a district court interlocutory injunction that temporarily reinstated Shira Perlmutter to her role as Register of Copyrights while litigation over her removal continues. Chief Justice Roberts formally set a deadline of November 10 for a response to the application. Perlmutter submitted a response on November 10. Blanche submitted a reply on November 12. The Court deferred the application for stay on November 28 pending the Court’s decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook.

Trump v. Cook: The government filed an emergency application on September 18 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a preliminary injunction issued by a district court that blocked President Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. Cook filed an opposition to the request on the same day. The Chief Justice formally set a deadline of September 25 for a response to the application. Cook filed a response on September 25. On October 1, the Court deferred action on the stay application pending oral argument in January 2026 and established a supplemental briefing schedule. Additional amicus briefs were filed on October 29. Both sides filed supplemental briefs on November 19 and the Court heard oral argument on Jan. 21, 2026.

Mullin v. Doe: The government filed an application on February 26 requesting the Supreme Court stay pending appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by a district court preliminarily enjoining then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from terminating temporary protected status designation for Syria. The government asked the Court to construe the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with a challenge to the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status designations for Haiti and granted certiorari before judgment of the consolidated cases while deferring action on the government’s request for a stay. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.

Trump v. Miot: The government filed an application on March 11 requesting the Supreme Court to stay a lower court order postponing then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s decision to terminate temporary protected status designation for Haiti. The government also asked the Court to treat the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and grant the petition. On March 16, the Court consolidated the case with Mullin v. Doe. The Court heard oral argument on April 29, 2026.